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Abstract
Context: System safety is the discipline for assessing the safety of socio-technical and software-intensive systems. While
system safety has been a vital area of research for many decades, its practices are empirically not well studied. Beyond
anecdotal evidence—case reports, interviews, forums, blogs—and insular surveys, we are missing large cross-disciplinary
investigations that promote research validation and knowledge transfer. Objective: We explore means of work that safety
practitioners rely on, factors influencing their performance, and their perception of their role. We examine observations
from previous collaborations with industry and from the literature. Methods:We build a construct of system safety practice,
collect data for this construct using an on-line survey, summarise and interpret the data, and investigate hypotheses based
on the previous observations. Results:We present the responses of 124 practitioners in safety-critical system and software
projects. Our respondents generally agree with statements such as: • safety decision making mainly depends on expert
opinion and project memory, • safety is occasionally a cost-benefit question, • current safety standards reach their limits
when applied in high automation domains, • assured reliability does not imply assured safety. Additionally, we contribute a
research design directing towards explanatory studies of safety practice. Conclusions:We observe that empirical research
of system safety practice requires more attention to mitigate the risk of undesirable mismatches between the state of the art
and the state of the practice. This situation offers many new research opportunities.
Keywords Safety-critical system · embedded software · empirical study · state of the practice · survey · questionnaire
1 Introduction
System safety practice (safety practice for short) is a remarkably
diverse field spanning many disciplines involved in the system
life cycle, influenced by heterogeneous criticality-driven safety
cultures [1, 2, 3] across various application domains, geograph-
ical regions, and regulatory authorities.
Researchers have surveyed and investigated practised ap-
proaches to accident prevention, for example, in the chemical
plant and nuclear power plant sectors [2] and in the construction
industries [3]. However, our literature search has not uncovered
a single officially published empirical investigation (i.e., a case
or field study, a controlled field experiment, a survey of practi-
tioners) of the effectiveness of practised approaches to prevent
or reduce software and (control) systems’ contributions to haz-
ards.
In the following, we highlight the motivations for our study, de-
scribe observations from previous research, outline our research
objective, and summarise the contributions of this work.
1* This work is partly supported by the Deutsche Forschungsge-
meinschaft (DFG) under the Grant no. 381212925. c© 2018. This
manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 li-
cense http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.
Reference Format: Gleirscher, M., & Nyokabi, A.. System Safety
Practice: An Interrogation of Practitioners about Their Activities,
Challenges, and Views with a Focus on the European Region. Un-
published working paper (August 6, 2019). Department of Computer
Science, University of York, UK. arXiv: 1812.08452 [cs.SE]
1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
From previous discussions and research collaborations, we col-
lected a variety of observations and developed several conjec-
tures.
From exploratory content analysis of more than 200 selected
question and answer posts on several safety practitioners’ (SP)
on-line channels between 2012 and 2016 and one expert inter-
view [4], we observe that the members of the discussion groups
1. discuss various issues with the application of stan-
dards, calculation of failure rates, correct planning of
safety tests, and completeness of hazard analyses;
2. are missing a standardised way of integrating safety
with security activities;
3. are concerned about the adequacy of methods, a lack
of safety education, and the misunderstanding of their
role.
From exploratory content analysis of more than 370 case re-
ports (i.e., on incidents and accidents) from the aviation (212),
automotive (73), and railway (60) domains, published between
2000 and 2016, and from 7 semi-structured interviews with SPs
from these domains [5], we observe that
4. human errors and specification errors were more often
reported as accident root causes than software imple-
mentation errors—this is consistent with the findings
in [6, 7, 8];
5. no IT security problems were reported as root
causes—a case for further investigation in the light of
the variety of known vehicle security threats [9, 10];
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6. reports in general, and comparatively often in the au-
tomotive domain, were non-informative of subtle ac-
cident root causes (i.e., causes lying outside the pos-
sibilities, budgets, or obligations of accident analysts
and investigators);
7. more than 30 of the selected reports suggest that
accidental complexity [11]—particularly, missing or
mistaken maintenance, refactoring, evolution, or
migration—negatively affects system safety;
8. interviewees report issues of unclear separation of sys-
tems and software engineering tasks [12];
9. interviewees state that available methods are appropri-
ate in their domains but can easily get insufficient for
future high-automation applications.
These observations remind of the variety of computer-related
risks [13] and of worries about the state of the practice and ed-
ucation in safety [14] and software [15] engineering (SE). How-
ever, these observations are anecdotal evidence and, while some
being obvious, yet with limited justification for being valid, re-
liable, or general.
1.2 Research Objectives
Motivated by the observations and conjectures summarised in
Section 1.1, we aim to explore safety practice and, where possi-
ble, seek for further evidence. Inspired by the research agenda
in [16], our exploration starts from three questions addressing
all of the issues 1 to 9:
1. Which means are SPs familiar with and which do they
use? How effective are those means?
2. What are the SPs’ challenges and expectations?
3. How do SPs view their profession and contribution in
the life cycle?
1.3 Contributions
We present results from a cross-sectional self-administered on-
line survey among safety practitioners. We compare their ex-
periences, opinions, and their self-perception with previous ob-
servations and conjectures about safety practice (Section 1.1).
From these conjectures, we derive several hypotheses (Sec-
tion 4.4) on safety practice and its practitioners. We analyse and
test these hypotheses based on the gathered data and interpret
the results (Section 5.1) with respect to previous experience and
existing evidence. We justify the questionnaire and the derived
hypotheses using existing research.
Furthermore, we respond to the request from Alexander et
al. [17] and Rae et al. [18] for applying improved methodology
in empirical research of safety practice, as well as the desire
of a stronger involvement of SPs in research evaluation such as
stated by Martins and Gorschek [16].
Finally, we contribute a research design (Section 3) for follow-
up assessments with the potential of application to other SE
domains (see, e.g. [19]).
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Figure 1: Overview of the research method for this article
1.4 Overview
Figure 1 provides an overview of the research procedures for
this article. After discussing terminology and related work in
Section 2 and describing our research method in Section 3, we
present our results in Section 4. Particularly, we describe our
sample in Section 4.2 and summarise the results of all valid re-
sponses in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 highlights the results of sev-
eral hypotheses tests. Our discussion follows in Section 5, with
the interpretation of our test results in Section 5.1 and the ex-
amination of threats to the validity of our study in Section 5.4.
We summarise our findings in Section 6. Appendix A contains
a detailed summary of the response data.
2 Background
We introduce important terms as well as related work we will
revisit in our discussions below.
2.1 Terminology and Definitions
The life cycle of an engineered system typically refers to the
phases of design, implementation, release, maintenance, oper-
ation, and disposal. Dependability then encompasses the han-
dling of reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety in
the life cycle, for example, by improving fault-tolerance [20,
21].
In this work, we focus on the discipline of system safety [22],2
including but not restricted to functional safety. System safety
is situated in the context of safety of machinery,3 process
2From software, electrical, electronics, control, and systems engi-
neering.
3From mechanical engineering.
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safety,4 structural safety,5 or occupational health and safety.
These disciplines have in common the identification, assess-
ment, and management of operational risk. This procedure in-
cludes the prevention or handling of undesired events at any
execution stage of a system (e.g. hazards or safety risks, inci-
dents, and accidents) and of any type (e.g. human error, soft-
ware faults, and system failures). In addition, security of infor-
mation technology (IT security or security for short) is the dis-
cipline of protecting computer-based systems and data against
malicious attacks and unauthorised access.
Then, safety practice denotes the practical aspects of system
safety in both industrial settings and applied research. Based on
this, we consider a safety practitioner as a person who supports
or performs safety decision making, particularly, by identify-
ing hazards and assessing their causes and consequences, the
design of hazard countermeasures (also known as hazard con-
trols), the assurance of safety, or by performing research and
consultancy for these safety activities. Importantly, there are
many means—that is, best practices, methods, techniques, and
standards—to apply in these activities.
2.2 Related Work
As indicated in Section 1, we found only few cross-disciplinary
exploratory inquiries of safety practice and its practitioners.
The following studies demonstrate the importance of empirical
methods (interviews and related survey methods such as focus
groups and questionnaires) in further examining safety practice.
Dwyer [23], for multiple disciplines, and Knight [12], for soft-
ware engineering, characterise safety practice from their expe-
rience, forecasting the ongoing trend of increased automation,
the increasingly critical interplay between the involved engi-
neering domains, and the corresponding challenges for future
safety research.
Adequacy of Means of Work in Safety Practice Safety-
critical systems are subjected to automation (i.e., the use of
qualified and verified tool chains) for their development, test-
ing, and overall assurance. Graaf et al. [24] and Kasurinen
et al. [25] investigate obstacles to the adoption of new meth-
ods and tools in embedded system RE, architecture design, and
software testing. Our study explores this direction within safety
practice.
Hatcliff et al. [26] summarise particular challenges in the cer-
tification of software-dependent systems and suggest improve-
ments, stressing the concept of “designed-in safety/security.”
These works inspired and underpin our hypotheses but are dif-
ferent from our survey approach to examining safety practice
and its practitioners.
Chen et al. [27] report on the challenges and best practices of
using assurance cases. Our questionnaire about safety practice
complements their study by exploring methods, training, and
interaction, backed by a larger set of data points.
Ceccarelli and Silva [28] propose a framework for maturity as-
sessment based on compliance checking during and after the
introduction of new safety standards (e.g. DO-178B) into or-
4From automation and plant engineering.
5From construction or civil engineering.
ganisations that engineer safety-critical systems. In our study,
we are asking SPs whether safety standards known and used
by our respondents, actually improve an organisation’s safety
practice.
McDermid and Rae [14] report on their cross-domain insights
into the practice of engineering safety-critical systems, dis-
cussing the question: “How did systems get so safe despite
inadequate and inadequately applied techniques?” Not presum-
ing that modern systems are acceptably safe, we interrogate SPs
about their means of work.
Wang and Wagner [29] investigate decision processes in safety
activities. For complex and highly critical systems such pro-
cesses are usually committee- or group-driven to reduce organ-
isational single points of failure. The authors examine whether
such decision making is prone to a number of pitfalls known
as “groupthink” and studied in group psychology. While our
study does not apply a psychology-based construct, our obser-
vation of the strong reliance on expert opinion strengthens their
conclusions.
Process Factors influencing Safety Practice Requirements
engineering (RE) and, particularly, requirements specification,
are critical points of failure in every safety-critical system
project [7, 8, 6]. Examining research on the communication and
validation of safety requirements in industrial projects, Martins
and Gorschek [16] observe a lack of evidence for the useful-
ness and usability of recent safety research. We want to con-
trast their finding with how practitioners perceive the adequacy
of their means of work.
Nair et al. [30] present results from a survey of 52 SPs on
how they manage the variety of safety evidence for critical
computer-based systems. Good evidence management implies
to tackle traceability for change impact analysis (CIA), that is,
the analysis of how changes of safety-critical artefacts (e.g.
specifications, issue databases, designs) are propagated and
whether these changes have negative safety impact. Borg et
al. [31] report on 14 interviews with SPs about their CIA ac-
tivities, finding that SPs have difficulties in understanding the
motivation of CIA, are overwhelmed by the information they
have to process when conducting CIA, and struggle with trust-
ing and updating former CIAs. From a cross-sectional survey of
97 practitioners, De la Vara et al. [32] observe insufficient CIA
tool support. Our study examines such means of work from a
more general viewpoint.
Huber et al. [33] interviewed 8 automotive safety and security
practitioners to find out how an integration of safety and se-
curity activities can avoid undesired incidents. The authors ob-
serve significant deficits of this integration, particularly, deficits
in the traceability of the impact of security-related system
changes on system safety.
In the Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4.1, we further relate these works
with our study. In Table 8 in Section 5.2, we compare their
findings with our results.
3 Survey Planning
This section describes the survey design (Section 3.1), the sur-
vey instrument (Section 3.3), the working hypotheses (Sec-
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Table 1: Classification criteria for characterising the population
and for sample assessment. Legend: MC. . .multiple-choice,
(N)ominal or (O)rdinal scale
Classification Criterion Scale
Educational Background N /MC
Application Domains N /MC
Level of Experience O / duration in years
Familiarity with Standards N /MC
Familiarity with Methods N /MC
Geographical Regions Open /MC
Native Languages N /MC
Working Languages N /MC
Safety-related Roles N /MC
tion 3.4), the procedure for data collection (Section 3.5) and
analysis (Section 3.6), and instrument evaluation (Section 3.7).
We follow the guidelines in [34] for planning and conducting
the survey and [35, 36, 37] for the reporting.
3.1 Research Goal and Questions
The observations and conjectures summarised in Section 1.1
pertain to potentially critical issues in safety practice. This
cross-sectional survey aims at resuming these issues. The ob-
jective of our exploration is
to investigate safety practice and its practi-
tioners and to examine observations we made
during our preliminary research.
For this, we explore three research questions:
RQ1 Which means do SPs typically rely on in their activities?
How helpful are those means to them?
RQ2 Which typical process factors have influence on SPs’ de-
cisions and performance?
RQ3 How do SPs perceive and understand their role in the pro-
cess or life cycle?
3.1.1 Construct
For this objective and these research questions, we introduce
the construct safety practice and its practitioners (SPP). This
construct incorporates SPs’ processes, tasks, roles, methods,
tools, and infrastructures and, by interrogating them via a ques-
tionnaire, their experience with and opinions about safety prac-
tice. SPP is divided into three sub-constructs: Classification of
SPs, Constituents of safety practice, and Expectations & chal-
lenges in safety practice. The construct is visualised in Fig-
ure 2.
The criteria for classification in Table 1, the break-down in Ta-
ble 2, and following research design are based on our research
experience in system safety, on collaborations with industry, on
expert interviews [38, 5, 4], and on previous work [39]. Rele-
vant data from these unpublished works is either presented here
or officially archived in [40]. The derivation of SPP follows
the grounded theory approach [41].
Below, we use prefixes for referencing content items: RQ for
research questions, h for working hypotheses, q for questions in
Table 2: Constituents of safety practice and practitioner’s ex-
pectations and challenges. Legend: (N)ominal or (O)rdinal
scale, (T)ruth values as nominal scale, * . . . half-open or open.
Construct Scales
Constituents of Safety Practice
Safety Process (activities,
roles, and practitioners)
N / e.g. decisions, hazard
identification, resources
Factors (constraints and issues) T / e.g. lack of resources, high
schedule pressure
Means (conventional
techniques; formal methods;
tools; norms; skills; knowledge
sources)
N* / e.g. FMEA, ISO26262,
FMEA expertise, expert
opinions
Application domains (current,
new, complex)
N* / e.g. systems based on
adaptive control, machine
learning
Expectations & Challenges in Safety Practice (as perceived by SPs)
Performance of safety activities O / high . . . low performance
Adequacy of means O / high . . . low adequacy
Collaboration between safety
and security engineers
O / effective . . . ineffective
collaboration
Value of knowledge sources to
SPs
O / high . . . low, per class of
methods or standards
Adaptation and improvement
of SPs’ skills
O / high . . . low
self-improvement/adaptation
Notion, perception, and
priority of safety activities
N*
Contribution of SPs to system
life cycle
O / high . . . low contribution
the questionnaire, and F for findings. References have the shape
〈X〉〈Label〉[−〈o〉] where X ∈ {RQ, h, q, F} and o can refer to an
answer option in the questionnaire.
3.2 Survey Participants and Population
Safety practitioners are our direct study subjects, our target
group. A safety practitioner is a person whose professional
activities as a practitioner or researcher in industry or academia
are tightly related to the engineering of safety-critical systems.
Table 1 lists criteria we use to characterise and identify mem-
bers of the population of SPs. Safety practice, as described
in Section 2.1, is our indirect study object. SPs participating in
our study are also called study or survey participants or respon-
dents.
3.3 Data Collection Instrument: On-line Questionnaire
Table 4 provides details on the (q)uestions. For traceability to
the construct developed according to grounded theory and for
concise presentation, we consolidated the original questions,
taking care of maintaining their original meanings. For verifi-
cation of this transformation, the original questionnaire [39] is
archived in [40].
3.3.1 Motivations underlying the Questions
In the following, we establish links between the questions and
the research summarised in Section 2.2.
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Figure 2: Research design for the construct “safety practice and its practitioners” (SPP, Section 3.1.1). The base (h)ypotheses
layer is backed by data of the (q)uestionnaire layer (dashed edges). The latter layer contains questions providing data about
(solid edges) expectations and challenges (boxes in grey). Expectations and challenges are formulated over (dotted edges) the
Constituents of safety practice (framed boxes). For the sake of brevity, classification criteria (Table 1) are omitted.
Table 3: Scales used in the questionnaire
Type Values
value very high (vh), (h)igh, (m)edium, (l)ow, very low (vl)
agreement strongly agree (sa), (a)gree, neither agree nor
disagree (nand), (d)isagree, strongly disagree (sd)
impact (h)igh, (m)edium, (l)ow, (n)o impact
adequacy very adequate (va), (a)dequate, slightly adequate
(sa), not adequate (na)
frequency often, rarely/occasionally, never; or all, many, few,
none
choice single/multiple: (ch)ecked, (un)checked; or yes, no
qAdeqOfMthStd Bloomfield and Bishop [42] contrast pre-
scriptive regulation with goal-based regulation, reviewing prac-
tice, highlighting potential benefits of safety cases along with
the challenge of gaining sufficient confidence. Taking a more
general position, question qAdeqOfMthStd is about norms ad-
equacy.
For maturity measurement, Ceccarelli and Silva [28] work with
a construct similar to the one in Table 2. By asking question
qAdeqOfMthStd, we cover practitioners’ opinions independent
of a specific norm.
The questions about adequacy of means (particularly,
qAdeqOfMthStd, qAppOfMeth, qPosImpOfFMs), aim at the
re-examination of known challenges as, for example, discussed
by Kasurinen et al. [25] and Graaf et al. [24].
The answer categories for question qAdeqOfMthStd are based
on industry sectors with a relatively high pace of innovation
and/or new, complex, but not yet well-understood system ap-
plications (e.g. self-driving cars).
qValueOfKnow Lethbridge et al. [43] observe that test and
quality documentation is the most likely maintained kind of
documentation. With question qValueOfKnow, we want to find
out about the role of project documentation in safety decision
making.
Rae and Alexander [44] examine how confidence in safety ex-
pert judgements (e.g. individual versus group judgements) is
justified and leads to actual validity of the conclusions the
further stages of the safety life cycle are based on. The au-
thors argue that expert risk assessments exhibit low effec-
tiveness in measuring risk as an objective quantity and pro-
pose “risk assessment as a means of describing, rather than
quantifying risk.” Their analysis extends the background of
qValueOfKnow.
qIntOfSafSec and qPrioOfSafety While Chen et al. [27] fo-
cus on the aspect of training and collaboration in safety as-
surance, our study crosses these aspects with the questions
qIntOfSafSec and qPrioOfSafety about interaction in and ef-
ficiency of safety activities.
The questions qIntOfSafSec, qValOfContrib, and qCoWorkers
address the integration of safety activities with the life cycle,
similar to Bjarnason et al. [45] on the alignment of RE and ver-
ification and validation.
In contrast to tool support for optimal auditing as investigated
by Dodd and Habli [46], our questions (i.e., qEffRoleOnJob,
qValOfContrib, qCoWorkers, and qImpOfExp) help to solicit
personal views of SPs as external auditors and consultants.
qImpOfConstr, qImpOfEco, and qNotionOfSafety As
summarised in Section 1.1, we presume negative consequences
of “accidental complexity” [11] on system safety. Lim et
al. [47] examine the perception of technical debt, highlight-
ing the inevitable trade-off between software quality and busi-
ness value. In an unfortunate case, an acceptance of techni-
cal debt can lead to an acceptance of low software quality, and
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Table 4: Transcription and summary of selected questions from the questionnaire. Legend: Nominal, (O)rdinal, (L)ikert-type
scale, (T)ruth values as nominal scale, MC. . .multiple-choice, * . . . half-open or open. Figures 12 to 23 show details on the
options; Sec./Fig. serves the navigation.
Question Scale (see Table 3) Sec. Fig. N
qValueOfKnow: Of how much value are specific knowledge sources for safety
decision making?
L* / value per source 4.3.1 12 97
qImpOfConstr: To which extent do specific process constraints and issues
negatively impact safety activities?
O* / impact per factor 4.3.2 13 93
qImpOfEco: How often do economic factors have a strong influence on the
handling of hazards?
O / frequency 4.3.3 – 93
qAdeqOfMthStd: Regarding a specific application domain, how adequate are
applicable safety standards and methods in ensuring safety?
O / adequacy per domain 4.3.4 14 102
qAppOfMeth: The application of conventional techniques (e.g. FMEA and FTA)
has become too difficult for complex applications of recent technologies.
L / agreement 4.3.5 15 97
qPosImpOfFMs: Estimate the positive impact of formal methods on safety
activities and system safety.
O / impact 4.3.6 16 58
qImprOfSkills: Specify your level of agreement with 4 statements about factors
improving a SP’s skills.
L / agreement per statement 4.3.7 17 96
qIntOfSafSec: Specify your level of agreement with 10 statements about the
interaction of safety and security activities.
L / agreement per statement 4.3.8 18 95
qNotionOfSafety: How is safety viewed in your field of practice? Nominal* /MC 4.3.9 19 95
qPrioOfSafety: Specify your level of agreement with 4 statements about factors
increasing the efficiency in safety activities.
L / agreement per statement 4.3.10 20 97
qEffRoleOnJob: Is your job affected by any predominant definition of your role? In
either case, we request for comment.
T* / comment 4.3.11 – 91
qEffNotionOnJob: Is your job affected by any predominant view of safety? In either
case, we request for comment.
T* / comment 4.3.12 – 95
qUndesiredEv: Specify your level of agreement with 5 statements about safety
activities.
L / agreement per statement 4.3.13 21 97
qValOfContrib: Of how much value is your role as a practitioner or researcher in
safety-critical system developments?
L / value 4.3.14 22a 95
qCoWorkers: How much value do non-safety co-workers attribute to the role of a
safety practitioner?
L / value 4.3.15 22b 95
qImpOfExp: Specify your level of agreement with 2 statements about the role of
experience in safety activities.
L / agreement per statement 4.3.16 23 96
for some systems, to an acceptance of accidental complexity.
Whenever this reasoning applies to a safety-critical system, we
should ask whether this system is taken in by an unacceptable
trade-off between safety and business value? Asking the ques-
tions qImpOfConstr, qImpOfEco, and qNotionOfSafety, we in-
versely probe the demand for investigations of the safety impact
of technical debt.
Based on the SPP construct, we interrogate SPs about sup-
portive factors (qValueOfKnow, qPrioOfSafety) and obstacles
(qImpOfConstr) in safety decision making.
3.3.2 Notes on the Questionnaire
Some questions in Table 4 are half-open, that is, we allow re-
spondents to extend the list of given answer options by using
an extra text field. Some questions are open, that is, we only
provide a single text field. Most demographic questions are
half-open multiple-choice (MC) questions, that is, they have a
text field “Other”.
The scales used for encoding the answers in the column “Scale”
are described in Table 3. We treat value and agreement as a
5-level Likert-type scale. Value, impact, adequacy, and fre-
quency scales are equipped with a “do not know (dnk)” option.
Together with “neither agree nor disagree (nand)” answers, par-
ticipants are given two ways to stay indecisive. This way, we try
to reduce bias by forced responses. From comparative analysis,
we conclude that it is safe to discard dnk-answers and missing
answers from our analyses.
We expect survey participants to spend 20–30 minutes on the
questionnaire. Although we do not collect personal data, they
can leave us their email address if they want to receive our re-
sults.
3.4 Working Hypotheses
We derive working hypotheses from our previous observa-
tions (Section 1.1). Table 5 contains two types of (h)ypotheses
we want to analyse and test with the data we collect from the
survey participants. The base hypotheses include observations
or assumptions based on our own previous work experience or
made by other researchers (Section 2.2). Additionally, we elab-
orate comparative hypotheses during exploratory analysis [48]
of the responses.
Some hypotheses in Table 5 are measured by a single ques-
tion (see, e.g. hExp:DivGTSing and qImpOfExp). We do not
collect data for each individual construct referred to in such hy-
pothesis/question pairs.
Figure 2 summarises the survey design presented in Sec-
tions 3.1 to 3.4 by showing important interrelationships be-
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tween the base hypotheses, the questions of the questionnaire,
and the parts of the SPP construct.
3.4.1 Motivations underlying the Hypotheses
Here, we justify the derivation of our hypotheses through links
to other research (Section 2.2).
hExpDecides: SPs’ activities mainly depend on expert
opinion and experience from similar projects It is well-
known that experts are fallible (see, e.g. recent investigations
in [49, 44, 29]) and, thus, relying on experts in organisational
(and engineering) decision making can contribute to critical
single points of failures in such organisations. Moreover, it
is well-known that reusing (e.g. cloning) repositories from fin-
ished projects in similar new projects bears many risks of errors
in reuse or update of these data. Our previous interviews sug-
gest that these knowledge sources are used in safety practice.
hLoResLoSaf: A lack of resources has a negative impact
on the performance of safety activities The observations
in Section 1.1 motivate the collection of evidence on whether
or not a lack of resources might have a negative impact on
safety activities. “Negative impact” refers to deferred safety
decisions, hindered hazard identification and implementation
of hazard controls, or limited SPs’ abilities to fill their role.
The conjecture that budgets constrain safety activities is further
inspired by “the willingness to accept some technical risks to
achieve business goals” as concluded by Lim et al. [47, p. 26].
hInsufStds: Safety activities for highly-automated applica-
tions lack support of appropriate standards and methods
The belief that safety practice is missing adequate standards
and methods has been discussed by Cant [50] and Knauss [51].
Questions about the appropriateness of methods and standards
have also been raised by McDermid and Rae [14]. The idea be-
hind hInsufStds is to understand the situation of SPs in new, not
yet matured industry sectors. SPs would have the opportunity to
adapt their skills and to gain further expertise (hSPsAdptSkls).
hSPsAdptSkls: SPs improve their skills towards new ap-
plications, e.g. by studying recent results in safety research
Hatcliff et al. [26] observe that “industry’s capability to ver-
ify and validate these systems has not kept up” (we inquire
willingness to improve skills with hSPsAdptSkls) and that “the
gap between practice and capability is increasing” because of
more integrated and more complex software technologies. In
contrast to the compliance framework presented by Ceccarelli
and Silva [28], Hatcliff et al. highlight that showing compliance
with existing norms cannot guarantee safety. Our study touches
norms adequacy with hInsufStds.
hInsufMeth: Conventional methods (e.g. FMEA, FTA) are
challenging to apply to complex modern applications The
observation that conventional methods have become inade-
quate is broached by Knight [12, 52]. Likewise, McDermid
and Rae [14] and Hatcliff et al. [26] underpin hInsufStds and
hInsufMeth, though not the long-standing [53] and frequent ex-
pectation that formal methods (FM) have a positive impact on
safety practice (hFMsImprSaf).
hFMsImprSaf: The use of formal methods has a positive
impact on the performance of safety activities The efficacy
of FMs in practice has been an only moderately researched sub-
ject for many years, investigated, for example, by Barroca and
McDermid [54] and Woodcock et al. [55]. One intention un-
derlying hFMsImprSaf is to determine whether we have to fur-
ther examine FM effectiveness to cross-validate reported expe-
riences (e.g. [56]).
hSafBySec: For current applications, the assurance of
safety also depends strongly on the assurance of security
Safety-critical applications of networked or connected (soft-
ware) systems have lately revived the question of how safety
and IT security influence each other (see, e.g. [33])? Along
these lines, the justification of hSafBySec is based on manifold
anecdotal evidence (see, e.g. [57]) that security problems can
cause safety violations and, possibly, vice versa.
hSafIsCost: Safety is more seen as a cost-increasing rather
than a cost-saving part in many application domains How
are the practical achievements and implications of system safety
and the effort spent therefor related? How relevant are such
utilitarian and controversial questions to SPs and their organi-
sations? Touching this subject, hSafIsCost is formulated in the
context of “total cost of safety,” that is, the cost of accident pre-
vention and accident consequences borne by organisations that
engineer and operate safety-critical systems. hSafIsCost’s truth
might contribute negatively to the role of SPs in an (engineer-
ing) organisation.
hLoCollLoSaf: A lack of collaboration of safety and se-
curity engineers has a negative impact on safety activities
According to Conway [58], the structure of an engineered sys-
tem converges towards the (communication) structure of its en-
gineering organisation. For example, in a safety-critical dis-
tributed embedded system (e.g. avionics, process automation,
and automotive architectures), team collaboration would de-
termine the architectural decomposition and direct communi-
cation links in the architecture. However, team collaboration
not necessarily implies keeping track of the impact of critical
changes across all critical relationships. It is known (e.g. [33])
that critical relationships in a complex architecture are far from
obvious. Such relationships are sometimes only indirectly per-
ceived as an undesired emergent property. Hence, we ask SPs
about the collaborations among so-called “property engineers,”
e.g. safety and security engineers (qIntOfSafSec).
hSafIsRel: SPs understand safety as a special case of relia-
bility Leveson [22] stresses an observed misconception about
system safety, namely that the responsibility to make systems
safe enough is reduced to the responsibility to make their crit-
ical parts just reliable enough. Her claim stimulates the ques-
tion to which extent SPs are solely driven by reliability con-
cerns and which negative implications this might have. More-
over, hSafIsRel is also motivated by examinations [59] of how
findings from previous accidents can be included in safety ar-
guments.
hAdapt:AutoGTAero: SPs using automotive standards
agree more than SPs using aerospace standards that skill
adaptation is required and takes place From several pre-
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Table 5: Overview of hypotheses (used as H1 in the tests). Legend: See Section 3.3. The quantification ranges a–j refer to
the answer options of the questions associated with the hypotheses, see Figures 12 to 23. The original questionnaire is archived
in [40].
Hypothesis Supported if . . . (AC, Section 3.6.2)
Base Hypotheses
hExpDecides: SPs’ activities mainly depend on (d) expert opinion
and (g) experience from similar projects.
∀o ∈ {d, g}:med(qValueOfKnowo) ∈ {h, vh} ∧ o among 3 highest
valued (of 7) knowledge sources ∧ med(qImpOfExpa) ∈ {a, sa}
hLoResLoSaf: There is a lack of resources that has a negative
impact on the performance of safety activities.
∀o ∈ {a, d}:med(qImpOfConstro) ∈ {m, h} ∧ med(qImpOfEco) ∈
{often} ∧ qNotionOfSafetyc ≤ 30
hInsufStds: Safety activities for highly-automated applications lack
support of appropriate standards and methods.
For ≥ 5 out of 7 domains o: med(qAdeqOfMthStdo) ∈ {sa, na}
hInsufMeth: Conventional methods (e.g. FMEA, FTA) are
challenging to apply to complex modern applications.
med(qAppOfMeth) ∈ {a, sa} ∧ qPosImpOfFMsm+h > 25%
hFMsImprSaf: The use of formal methods has a positive impact on
the performance of safety activities.
med(qPosImpOfFMs) ∈ {m, h}
hSPsAdptSkls: SPs improve their skills towards new applications,
e.g. by studying recent results in safety research.
∀o ∈ {a, b}:med(qImprOfSkillso) ∈ {a, sa}
hSafBySec: For current applications, the assurance of safety also
depends strongly on the assurance of security.
∀o ∈ {a, c, e, f }:med(qIntOfSafSeco) ∈ {a, sa}
hSafIsCost: Safety is more seen as a cost-increasing rather than a
cost-saving part in many application domains.
qNotionOfSafetyach > 60% ∧ ∀o ∈ {b, e}: qNotionOfSafety
o
ch < 40%
hLoCollLoSaf: A lack of collaboration of safety and security
engineers has a negative impact on safety activities.
∀o ∈ {h, i, j}:med(qIntOfSafSeco) ∈ {a, sa}
hHiPrioHiSaf: Prioritisation of safety in management decisions
enables SPs to perform their tasks more efficiently.
∀o ∈ {a, b}:med(qPrioOfSafetyo) ∈ {a, sa}
hSafIsRel: SPs understand safety as a special case of reliability. ∀o ∈ {a, e}:med(qUndesiredEvo) ∈ {a, sa} ∧ ∀o ∈
{b, c}:med(qUndesiredEvo) ∈ {d, sd}
hSafIsValued: SPs believe that their non-safety co-workers attribute
high value to SPs’ contributions.
med(qCoWorkers) ∈ {h, vh} ∧ med(qValOfContrib) ∈ {m, h, vh}
hPosSelfImg: SPs perceive their contribution as highly valuable. med(qValOfContrib) ∈ {h, vh} ∧ med(qCoWorkers) ∈ {m, h, vh}
Comparative Hypotheses
hExp:DivGTSing: SPs with high diverse expertise better perform in
safety activities) than SPs with low singular expertise.
∀o ∈ {a, b}:med(qImpOfExpo) ∈ {a, sa} ∧ med(qImpOfExpc) ∈
{nand, a, sa}
hValue:SenLTJun: Senior SPs attribute lower value to their role in
the system life-cycle than junior SPs (cf. hSafIsValued,
hPosSelfImg).
One-sided U succeeds with p < 0.05
hAdapt:SenGTJun: Senior SPs agree more than junior SPs that skill
adaptation (e.g. learning) is required and takes place (cf.
hSPsAdptSkls).
One-sided U succeeds with p < 0.05
hAdapt:AutoGTAero: SPs using automotive standards agree more
than SPs using aerospace standards that skill adaptation (e.g.
learning) is required and takes place (cf. hSPsAdptSkls).
One-sided U succeeds with p < 0.05
hInsufMeth:EngDifSci: Engineering-focused SPs agree different
from research-focused SPs with hInsufMeth.
Two-sided U succeeds with p < 0.05
hInsufMeth:AutoGTAero: SPs using automotive standards agree
more than SPs using aerospace standards with hInsufMeth.
One-sided U succeeds with p < 0.05
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vious discussions with SPs, we learned the view that system
safety practice in the automotive domain is for several rea-
sons less extensive than in other domains, such as aerospace.
Hence, we assume that automotive SPs are more strongly in-
volved in or aware of skill development in their domain than
SPs in aerospace.
3.5 Data Collection Procedure: Sampling
To draw a diverse sample of safety practitioners, we
1. advertise our survey on safety-related on-line discus-
sion channels,
2. invite practitioners and researchers in safety-related
domains from our social networks, and
3. ask these people to disseminate information about our
survey.
Our sampling procedure can best be described as a mixture of
opportunity, volunteer, and cluster-based sampling. The cluster
is formed by survey participants from several of these channels.
We expect our sample to be stronger than non-randomised but,
because of a lack of control of the sampling process, weaker
than uniformly random.
Sample Representativeness To check how well our final
sample appropriately represents safety practice and its prac-
titioners, the questionnaire measures the classification criteria
in Table 1. See [40] for the questions used for this.
3.6 Analysis Procedure
This section describes the analysis of the responses, the check-
ing of the working hypotheses, and our tooling.
3.6.1 Analysis of Responses
We use instruments of descriptive statistics [60] such as me-
dian (med), mean (µ), variance (var), and frequency histograms
to summarise the responses per question.
Half-Open and Open Questions We use answers from the
text field “Other” to extend and revise the classifications im-
posed by the given answer options. See Section 4.2 for the
results. Furthermore, we close some of the main questions
using qualitative content analysis and coding [61]. For some
half-open questions, we extend the statement lists and nominal
scales accordingly. The results of this step are shown in Sec-
tion 4.3 when discussing the questions in the Sections 4.3.1,
4.3.2, 4.3.9, 4.3.11 and 4.3.12.
3.6.2 Hypothesis Analysis and Statistical Tests
We use non-statistical analysis for all base hypotheses for
which we directly6 collect data (Table 5).
For most comparative hypotheses, we apply the Mann-
Whitney U test [60] (U for short) to check for difference. We
use U if the following assumptions hold:
6For example, hypothesis hInsufMeth refer to Adequacy of means.
To keep our questionnaire lean, qAppOfMeth directly measures agree-
ment for one instance of this hypothesis.
• exactly one Likert-type or ordered-categorical depen-
dent variable (DV),
• random division into two groups,
• group members are not paired,
• treatments via independent variables (IV) are already
applied,
• group sizes may differ and be small (< 30),
• per-group distributions of the DV may be dissimilar
and non-Gaussian.
Let H be a hypothesis and α be the maximum chance of a Type I
error, that is, incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis H0. U
tries to reject H0 with a confidence of 1 − α. We require p < α
for the Type I error p of incorrectly distinguishing two groups
of respondents with respect to H. If U succeeds to reject H0
then the support of the desired alternative hypothesis H1 is
increased. Failure of U in rejecting H0 (i.e., p ≥ α) denies
any conclusion on H from the given data set [62, p. 168]. The
medium maturity and criticality of our hypotheses (for an ex-
ploratory study) and the medium accuracy of our data (from a
survey method) justify α = 0.05.
Acceptance Criteria (AC) The criteria in Table 5 describe
the aggregation of the question scales in Table 3 to match the
hypotheses. These criteria are built from symbols of the kind
q〈id〉
〈answer option〉
〈scale value(s)〉
referring to the questions in Table 4. We re-
quiremed to be non-central to express a large supportive major-
ity. Alternatively, percentage thresholds (e.g. > 25%) express
the desired variance or shape of the distribution. In hypothesis
tests, we mainly use classification criteria (Table 1) as IVs.
3.6.3 Tooling
We use Unipark7 as a platform for implementing on-line
surveys and for data collection (Section 3.5) and temporary
storage. For statistical analysis and data visualisation (Sec-
tion 3.6.2) we use GNU R8 and Unipark. Content analysis and
coding takes place in typical spreadsheet applications.
3.7 Validity Procedure after Survey Planning
In the following, we evaluate the face and content validity of
our instrument, and the internal and construct validity of our
study. Although, we did not perform an independent pilot study
according to [36], we took several measures to assess the valid-
ity of our study.
3.7.1 Instrument Evaluation: Face and Content Validity
Both authors performed several internal walk-throughs to im-
prove the survey design and the data analysis procedure. Along
the lines of a focus group, we asked independent persons to
complete the questionnaire and to provide feedback via an extra
form field in the questionnaire and via email. This dry run took
place between 13 and 27 June 2017. We gathered 7 responses,
from 2 postgraduate research assistants with experience in the
survey method, and with experience in safety-critical software,
7See http://www.unipark.de.
8See https://www.r-project.org.
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systems, and requirements engineering, 1 master student with
industrial work experience in safety-critical systems engineer-
ing, 1 IT practitioner and English native speaker, 1 person with
a health and safety background, 2 practising software engi-
neers.
The feedback from the these respondents resulted in
• an extension and balancing of answer options,
• the alignment of answer scales throughout the whole
questionnaire,
• improvement of the nomenclature (terms are now de-
scribed on the questionnaire page they first appear).
• an extension of open answer fields, and
• linguistic improvements.
These steps helped us to improve questionnaire completeness,
consistency, and comprehensibility and to reduce researcher
bias. The full questionnaire is available in [40].
3.7.2 Internal Validity of the Analysis Procedure
Why would the procedure in Section 3 lead to reasonable and
justified results?
U is applicable only if groups are independent with respect to
the considered IV. Hence, when using MC-questions as IVs
in comparisons, we ensure a partitioning of the sample by ex-
cluding data points shared between groups. For example, with
qNotionOfSafety as IV, respondents who are in both groups
“responses with choice (c)” and “responses with choice (a)”
are omitted.
The 7 test data points allowed us to validate our tooling (e.g. R
scripts, see Section 3.6.3). Test data points are not included in
the final data set.
3.7.3 Construct Validity
Why would the construct (Section 3.1.1) appropriately repre-
sent the phenomenon to investigate?
Because of the exploratory nature [48] of our study, the sub-
constructs and their scales in Table 2 represent the study object
as reconstructed from our analyses. The working hypotheses
and the questionnaire represent an approximation and a selec-
tion of what needs to be measured and tested if we were to in-
vestigate this study object (cf. Figure 2) in an explanatory study.
For example, we assume that the 10 statements in Figure 18 for
question qIntOfSafSec satisfactorily approximate the “interac-
tion of safety and security activities” (i.e., construct Collabo-
ration) and its criticality. Consequently, the scales in Table 2
serve as a reference to the internal validation of our study.
The low strength of hypotheses derivable from our exploratory
construct limits the strength of our conclusions. For exam-
ple, an accepted hFMsImprSaf (i.e., FMs have a positive im-
pact) reflects very much the personal experience, perception, or
opinion of our survey participants. Their view has to be dis-
tinguished from the question of actual FM effectiveness. To
pursue such a question in future work, we suggest to refine our
construct using the technology acceptance model [63].
Table 6: Safety-related channels we advertised our survey on
(sorted alphabetically by category, full list in [39, pp. 92f])
Channel Type Example/References
Facebook sites E.g. Int. Society of SPs
General panels SurveyCircle, www.surveycircle.com
LinkedIn
groups
E.g. on ARP 4754, DO-178, ISO 26262
Mailing lists E.g. system safety (U Bielefeld,9 formerly U York)
Newsletters GI requirements engineering
Personal web-
sites
E.g. profiles on Twitter, LinkedIn, Xing
ResearchGate Q&A forums on www.researchgate.net
Xing groups E.g. safety engineering
Other channels E.g. board of certified safety professionals
Furthermore, an extended version of our inquiry of SPs about
supportive factors and obstacles in safety decision making
could include questions about “safety evidence traceability and
management.” Our questionnaire could therefore be extended
by criteria examined in Nair et al. [30], De la Vara et al. [32]
and Borg et al. [31].
The sub-construct Constituents resembles the framework for
safety process maturity assessment as proposed by Ceccarelli
and Silva [28]. By deriving our questionnaire from qualitative
analysis of several discussions and interviews with practition-
ers, we follow an established research methodology (see, e.g.
[64]). Overall, we believe our design is appropriate with re-
spect to the expressive power of the working hypotheses and
serves as a good starting point for successive explanatory stud-
ies.
3.7.4 Reliability
A check for test-retest reliability (e.g. changing attitudes of re-
spondents) and alternate form reliability are out of scope of this
exploratory study. Hence, we do not plan to ask respondents to
answer the questionnaire more than once and we run only one
variant of the questionnaire.
4 Survey Results
In this section, we characterise our sample (Section 4.2), sum-
marise the responses (Section 4.3), and analyse our hypothe-
ses (Section 4.4).
4.1 Survey Execution: Sample Size and Response Rate
For the collection of data from the participants, we
1. advertised our survey over the channels in Table 6 and
2. personally invited more than 20 persons.
The sampling period lasted from 1 July 2017 til 25 September
2017. In this period, we repeated step 1 up to three times to
increase the number of participants. The Unipark tracking data
shows that LinkedIn groups, ResearchGate, Twitter, and mail-
ing lists were effective in soliciting respondents, however, it
does not disclose which channels were most effective.
9See http://www.systemsafetylist.org.
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Figure 3: History of responses
After 565 views of the questionnaire, our final sample contains
N′ = 124 (partial) responses with N = 93 completed ques-
tionnaires and N = 91 (73%) complete10 data points. Figure 3
depicts the distribution of responses over time. According to
Unipark, respondents spent 20 minutes on average to provide
complete data points, 50% spent within 14 and 24 minutes time.
Based on the member count of specific channels (e.g. for
LinkedIn groups), the return rates of responses per channel
range from 0.1 to 5%.
According to the classification criteria, we will reason about
sub-groups of the sample with at least 15 data points. Ap-
pendix A provides the data summaries (i.e., number of answers
per option) for all questions.
4.2 Description of the Sample
We describe our sample in the following and estimate the ex-
tent to which it represents (Section 3.5) the population of SPs.
For each classification criterion in Table 1, we provide a chart
or we name the up to 10 most frequently occurring answers,
ordered by frequency. Percentages (%) right of the bars indi-
cate the fraction of the 93 completed questionnaires, shown in
parentheses the (N)umber of respondents who chose the corre-
sponding option. Note that most of the classification questions
allow MC answers.
Educational Background Figure 4 summarises the educa-
tional background of all respondents:
• Computer scientists include software engineers and
computer engineers
• Electrical and electronics engineers
• Safety scientists include safety engineers, occupa-
tional safety practitioners, health and safety practition-
ers, human factors engineers, ergonomics engineers
• Mechanical and aerospace engineers
• Systems engineers include poly-technical systems en-
gineers, information systems engineers, business tech-
nologists, engineering business administrators, engi-
neering project managers
• Physicists and mathematicians
• Other discipline includes chemists, biochemists, civil
engineers, language scientists
10Apart from two options of the classification question Safety-
related Roles (66, 76) and the question qPosImpOfFMs (62), we had
at least 91 up to 124 responses for each question.
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Figure 4: Educational Background (frequency, MC)
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Figure 5: Application Domains (frequency, MC)
Application Domains Figure 5 summarises the application
domain of all respondents where “aerospace” includes space
telescopes; “industrial processes and plant automation” in-
cludes manufacturing, chemical processes, oil and gas, energy
infrastructure, and small power plants; “railway systems” in-
cludes railway signalling; “construction and building automa-
tion” includes civil engineering applications; and “other do-
mains” includes food safety, biological safety, research and de-
velopment, and environment, health, and safety preparations.
Level of Experience Figure 6 indicates that our sample of
SPs is moderately balanced across all experience levels.
Familiarity with Standards Figure 7 provides an overview
of safety-related standards our respondents are familiar with
(distinguished by generality or by application domain): Stan-
dards from aerospace (e.g. ARP 4761, DO-178, DO-254),
generic standards (e.g. ISO 61508, DIN VDE 0801) automo-
tive (e.g. ISO 26262), machinery (e.g. ISO 13849, 25199, DIN
EN 62061, MRL 2006/42/EG), military (e.g. MIL-STD 882,
UK Def Std 00-55), railway (e.g. CENELEC EN 50126, 50128,
51029, 62061), power plants (e.g. IEC 60880, 61513, 62138,
60987, 62340, IEC 800), and medical devices (e.g. IEC 80001,
ISO 14971, AAMI/UL 2800). 14 participants were neither fa-
miliar with any of the given standards nor did they specify other
standards.
Familiarity with Methods Figure 8 shows the familiarity
of our respondents with prevalent concepts of safety analy-
sis and the corresponding classes of methods, techniques, or
notations:11 For example, FMEA, FMECA, or FMEDA to
assess failure mode effects; HazOp studies, ergonomic work
analysis and intervention methodology to assess hazard oper-
ability; STAMP-based methods for hazard (STPA) and acci-
dent (CAST) analysis; FHA, FFA, PHA, or PHL to assess risk
at a functional or abstract design level; common cause (CCA)
11Abbreviations are described in Table 9 in Appendix B.
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Figure 7: Familiarity with Standards and use by domain (fre-
quency, MC)
or common mode (CMA) analysis to include dependencies
and interactions; fault injection and property checking as
techniques of automated validation and verification (V&V);
STRIDE or CORAS to assess and handle security threats; bidi-
rectional methods such as Bowties or cause-consequence anal-
ysis; Markov chains for probabilistic risk analysis, and GSN
and SACM to build assurance cases. For “Other”, our par-
ticipants mentioned a variety of approaches (no more than
twice): 5S, 5W, CASS, coexistence analysis, FRAM, HazRAC,
HEART, HRA, MTA, (O)SHA, SAR, SCRA, SHARD, SSHA,
Poka Yoke, prognostic analysis, WBA, ZHA, ZSA.
Only 4 respondents state familiarity with methods to assess and
handle security threats. 15 respondents neither checked any of
the given methods nor did they specify other methods that are
relevant in their safety activities.
Geographical Regions DE (24.3%), UK (16.4%), US
(15.3%), AU (6.2%), FR (5.1%), IT (3.4%), CA (3.4%), CN
(2.8%), and CH (2.8%).
Native Languages Figure 9 provides an overview of the lan-
guages spoken by the respondents.
Working Languages Figure 10 provides an overview of the
languages used at work by the respondents.
Safety-related Roles In Figure 11, the term practitioner in-
cludes the profile of an engineer and a manager. Regard-
ing engineering disciplines and domains, “safety practitioner”
includes engineers or managers in system safety, functional
safety, or in other safety domains as well as technology risk
managers in general; “software practitioner” includes develop-
ers, architects, and tool developers; “systems practitioners” in-
cludes system analysts and system architects; “health & safety
practitioner” includes occupational safety practitioners, human
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Other Concept/Method
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9.87% (N=15)
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Figure 8: Familiarity with Methods and concepts (frequency,
MC)
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3.29% (N=5)
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25% (N=38)
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Figure 9: Native Languages and concepts (frequency, MC)
factors engineers, and ergonomists; and “V & V practitioner”
includes test and assurance practitioners. For “Other”, our re-
spondents include a civil engineer, a project manager, a method
engineer, and a maintainability engineer.
Regarding responsibility profiles, the category “Consultant /
Assessor” includes independent evaluators, auditors, regula-
tors, and inspectors dealing with safety certification.
4.3 Summary of Responses
In this section, we summarise the responses to the questions in
Table 4.
Guide to the Figures The following text and figures com-
plement each other. For Likert-type scales, we use centred
diverging stacked bar charts as recommended by [65]. med
denotes the median and “ex” indicates the number of excluded
data points per answer option.
4.3.1 qValueOfKnow: Value of Knowledge Sources
Figure 12 shows that, among the knowledge sources we asked
our participants to rate, expert opinion, previous experience
in safety-related projects, and case reports represent the three
highest valued knowledge sources used in safety activities and
safety decision making. Management recommendations turn
out to be the lowest valued knowledge source.
The following knowledge sources, or resources in more gen-
eral, were additionally mentioned to be of very high or high
value:
Four respondents referred to the concept of adversarial think-
ing, mentioning “creative mind”, “imagination”, “analysis ca-
pability,” and “acceptance of human fallibility.” Three respon-
dents pointed to the concept of domain expertise and expe-
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Figure 10: Working Languages and concepts (frequency, MC)
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Figure 11: Safety-related Roles (frequency, MC) split into dis-
ciplines (top) and responsibility profiles (bottom)
rience, mentioning “gut feel”, “subject matter knowledge of
the application,” and “...real work and related problems in ref-
erence situations...” Furthermore, they mentioned education,
specification documents and tools (e.g. “use of SPARK”), inde-
pendent assessment, in-service monitoring logs, and previously
certified similar systems.
4.3.2 qImpOfConstr: Constraints on Safety Activities
According to Figure 13, inexperienced safety engineers (g)
and erroneous hazard analyses (e) gained the most ratings in
the category “significant negative impact on safety activities.”
Postponed safety decisions (c) achieved the largest consensus.
Vague safety standards (f) constitutes the bottom of this rank-
ing but is still rated with medium or high negative impact by
the majority of respondents.
The following factors (i.e., process constraints and issues) were
additionally mentioned to have high negative impact on safety
activities:
Eight respondents broach the issue of missing management ex-
pertise and support: “Lack of education of managers in need
for safety” identifies one respondent from the oil and gas in-
dustry. Another one states that there is a “general perception
that safety is only paper work” and perceives a “lack of safety
knowledge within management.” One practitioner was even
pointing to a “lack of general safety culture.”
Three participants criticise that the degree of collaboration is
too low: They perceive a “lack of system level engineering ex-
perience” as well as “soloed working practices without a clear
view of [an] integrated safety concept” and that the organisation
is “minimising [the] involvement of safety process/engineers
into [the] development process.”
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med=High, ex=0
(d) Expert opinions,
med=High, ex=0
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recommendations, med=Medium,
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(g) Safety−related project
experience, med=Very high,
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Figure 12: qValueOfKnow (N = 97): Value of knowledge
sources – Of how much value are specific knowledge sources
for safety decision making?
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11%
13%
14%
18%
18%
28%
92%
89%
87%
86%
82%
82%
72%
(a) Budget cuts, med=Medium
impact, ex=5
(b) Late or unclear choice of
safety concepts, med=High
impact, ex=2
(c) Postponed safety
decisions, med=High impact,
ex=6
(d) Schedule pressure,
med=High impact, ex=5
(e) Erroneous hazard
analyses, med=High impact,
ex=4
(f) Vague safety standards,
med=Medium impact, ex=1
(g) Inexperienced safety
engineers, med=High impact,
ex=2
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Percentage
No impact
(6)
Low impact
(3)
Medium impact
(2)
High impact
(1)
Figure 13: qImpOfConstr (N = 100): Negative impact on
safety activities – To which extent do specific process con-
straints and issues negatively impact safety activities?
Regarding incomplete or inadequate hazard lists, respondents
mention “unidentified hazard domains” and “imagined safety
cases not based on real workers experience.” Along with that,
one practitioner mentions the issue of “poorly defined require-
ments”: Such requirements, when coming from upstream, are
known to have a negative effect on many downstream engi-
neering activities. Conversely, inadequate hazard lists result-
ing from such activities can again have a negative impact on
downstream sub-system requirements specification.
Regarding compliance with norms, one respondent was criticis-
ing the “transfer of concern from assessment to compliance,”
in other words, compliance bias. Two others are broaching
the opposite phenomenon of compliance ignorance, mention-
ing “general ISO 26262 standard ignorance” and a “lack of un-
derstanding of regulatory framework.”
Furthermore, according to another participant’s experience
there is “too much faith in testing” and “reluctance to use for-
mal methods.”
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Figure 14: qAdeqOfMthStd (N = 102): Adequacy of meth-
ods and standards – Regarding a specific application domain,
how adequate are applicable safety standards and methods in
ensuring safety?
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Figure 15: qAppOfMeth (N = 97): Applicability of methods
– The application of conventional techniques (e.g. FMEA and
FTA) has become too difficult for complex applications of re-
cent technologies.
4.3.3 qImpOfEco: Influence of Economic Factors
More than a third (36%) of the survey participants share the
view that economic factors often strongly influence the way how
hazards are handled, about half of them (48%) think that such
influence happens rarely or occasionally (median), and for 9%
such influences are not recognisable.
4.3.4 qAdeqOfMthStd: Adequacy of Methods and Standards
According to Figure 14, traffic control (f) and medical and
healthcare applications (e) are most often believed to be sup-
ported by adequate methods and standards. However, for all
domains, at least 50% of the respondents think that the avail-
able means are only slightly or not at all adequate for safety
assurance. This question exhibits a relatively large number of
dnk-answers.
4.3.5 qAppOfMeth: Applicability of Methods
The nand-median in Figure 15 shows that there is no tendency
or no clear consensus among respondents on whether or not
conventional methods have become too difficult to apply in cur-
rent applications.
4.3.6 qPosImpOfFMs: Positive Impact of Formal Methods
The median of “medium impact” in Figure 16 indicates a con-
sensus among the participants on that the use of FMs might
have a positive impact on the effectiveness of safety activities.
31% 69%Impact on FMs, med=Mediumimpact
100 50 0 50 100
Percentage
No impact
(4)
Low impact
(3)
Medium impact
(2)
High impact
(1)
Figure 16: qPosImpOfFMs (N = 58): Positive impact of formal
methods – Estimate the positive impact of formal methods on
safety activities and system safety.
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(b) Study state−of−the−art
safety principles, med=Agree,
ex=9
(c) Juniors learn from
seniors, med=Agree, ex=6
(d) Juniors learn from
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100 50 0 50 100
Percentage
Strongly disagree
(5)
Disagree
(4)
Neither agree nor disagree
(3)
Agree
(2)
Strongly agree
(1)
Figure 17: qImprOfSkills (N = 96): Improvement of skills –
Specify your level of agreement with 4 statements about factors
improving a SP’s skills.
However, we only have a low number of responses resulting
from missing answers and we excluded dnk-answers.
4.3.7 qImprOfSkills: Improvement of Skills
According to Figure 17, SPs agree moderately (39%) to
strongly (54%) with the requirement to adapt their professional
skills to new technologies. However, significantly less consen-
sus was achieved among the respondents on whether junior SPs
should learn from accident reports.
4.3.8 qIntOfSafSec: Interaction of Safety and Security
The high moderate and strong agreement in Figure 18 indi-
cates that most of our participants perceive interactions between
safety and security as critical.
SPs agree on that interaction between safety and security prac-
titioners during requirements engineering and system assurance
rarely occurs (g,f). Furthermore, agreement is achieved for the
“negative influence of a lack of collaboration (between safety
and security engineers)” (h,i) and for the “positive influence of
such a collaboration” (j) on safety activities. However, we ob-
serve 7% of disagreement with the “requirement of ultimate IT
security for safety.”
No consensus is achieved regarding the dependence of security
on safety (b,d). As opposed to that, respondents agree on the
dependence of safety on security (a,c,e).
4.3.9 qNotionOfSafety: Notion of Safety
The answers in Figure 19 show that many participants seem
to be reluctant to associating cost/benefit schemes with man-
agement decision making in system safety (a,b). Accord-
ingly, many responses indicate that safety is treated as a cost-
independent necessity (c). However, 51 (32%) responses were
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(a) Security is prerequisite for
safety, med=Agree, ex=3
(b) Safety is prerequisite for
security, med=Neither agree nor
disagree, ex=3
(c) SPs depend on security
practitioners, med=Agree, ex=4
(d) Security practitioners depend on
SPs, med=Neither agree nor disagree,
ex=6
(e) Safety assurance requires security
assurcance, med=Agree, ex=5
(f) Rare interaction in requirements
stage, med=Agree, ex=11
(g) Rare interaction in assurance
stage, med=Agree, ex=11
(h) Lack of collaboration is hazardous,
med=Agree, ex=4
(i) Lack of collaboration is
inefficient, med=Agree, ex=5
(j) Involvement in RE improves safety,
med=Agree, ex=3
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Figure 18: qIntOfSafSec (N = 95): Interaction of safety and
security – Specify your level of agreement with 10 statements
about the interaction of safety and security activities.
(e) A secondary issue
(b) A beneficial factor
(a) A cost factor
(d) A tedious mandated task
(c) A necessity independent of cost
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Figure 19: qNotionOfSafety (N = 95, MC): Frequency of
safety notions – How is safety viewed in your field of practice?
It is viewed as . . .
given to the view of safety as an “important, yet secondary, and
tedious mandated issue” (d,e).
Beyond the five given answer options, the notions of safety ad-
ditionally given by our respondents range from a “huge effort
generating source”, a “marketing gadget”, a “high level prod-
uct performance characteristic”, a “regulation”, a “general and
common demand”, a “must have” up to being “essential.”
Importantly, two respondents add that it depends “on the man-
ager or the engineer” or “on the stakeholder and on the safety
professional.” An ergonomist with 3 to 7 years of work experi-
ence says that “ergonomists usually are seen as added value to
[the field] because we try to work to improve performance and
health at the same time, safety is the natural outcome of this
methodology.”
4.3.10 qPrioOfSafety: Priority of Safety
Figure 20 indicates a consensus of the respondents for all
given options (a–d). Particularly, increased priority of safety
decisions (a) and defined safety processes (d) positively con-
tribute to the efficiency of safety activities. The Sections 4.3.11
and 4.3.12 provide more details on the factors believed to in-
crease the efficiency and effectiveness of safety activities as
well as dual factors assumed to decrease the efficiency and
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Figure 20: qPrioOfSafety (N = 97): Efficiency of safety activ-
ities – Specify your level of agreement with several statements
about factors increasing the efficiency in safety activities.
effectiveness thereof. Along the way, comparatively many
SPs (17%) do not offer any agreement on authority (c).
4.3.11 qEffRoleOnJob: Effect of Role Model on a SP’s Job
We asked our respondents to comment on whether and how
their job is affected by the definition of their role, if any, in their
organisations and application domains.
Apart from 5 dnk-answers, we received 56 answers saying
“yes” and, thus, stating that the role of a SP is clearly de-
fined. These SPs perceive or expect the following positive con-
sequences on their job (frequency given in parentheses, in de-
scending order): Clear role definitions . . .
• have a general positive impact on a SP’s activities (24),
• lead to clear responsibilities, authority, and escalation
routes (13),
• allow good integration of safety activities into the sur-
rounding system life cycle processes (6),
• can make the achievement of compliance easier (1),
and
• let SPs maintain autonomy or independence to carry
through their most critical activities (1).
However, our study participants report on the following nega-
tive effects on their job: Clear role definitions can . . .
• make engineers entirely push away safety-related re-
sponsibilities as a consequence of separating teams
into safety and non-safety co-workers (2),
• lead to complex process definitions (1),
• get rather independent SPs exposed to company-wide
resource and risk management (1), and
• impose a wrong focus or unnecessarily constrain a
SP’s tasks (1).
Moreover, 30 participants responded with a “no” and, hence,
state that the role of a SP is not clearly defined. These SPs
consider or expect the following positive consequence on their
job: Unclear role definitions . . .
• may promote more freedom to act, for example, to de-
velop and employ new and more effective safety ap-
proaches (3).
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However, our respondents also perceive several negative effects
on their job: Unclear role definitions . . .
• can entail unclear or wrong responsibilities, limited
authority and autonomy, and limited space for discre-
tionary activity (9),
• promote unclear, one-sided, or late decision making,
in the worst case, rushed processing of checklists (6),
• have a general negative impact on a SP’s tasks (4),
• can lead to disintegrated conceptions of safety, sepa-
rated communities with a lack of communication and
coordination, promoting unnecessarily confined deci-
sions (3),
• can decrease the appreciation of a SP’s analysis capa-
bilities (2), and
• increase the risk of unqualified personnel assuming the
role of a SP (2).
4.3.12 qEffNotionOnJob: Effect of Safety Notion on a SP’s
Job
We asked our respondents to comment on whether and
how their job is affected by a predominant notion of
safety (qNotionOfSafety), if any, in their organisations and ap-
plication domains.
Apart from 9 dnk-answers, we received 74 answers indicating a
“yes” and, hence, stating that the notion of safety has an effect
on their job: 10 respondents do not provide a specific com-
ment. The others argue from several notions of safety they have
perceived in their environments. Below, we provide answer
frequencies and cite a few answers underpinning the summary
statements.
Non-supportive Notions of Safety 24 participants describe
their experiences with a non-supportive, misunderstood, or un-
derrated safety culture. They report that . . .
. . .SPs have difficulties to argue their findings (9): “Right
now there is no ability to have the safety requirement over-
ride standard functional requirements.” – “1. Our job always
gets delayed and we are the last to get the inputs. 2. Non-
safety engineers always try to justify or avoid the sugges-
tions/findings. 3. It is difficult to sell safety culture to non-safety
engineers/managers.” – “I have to spend extra time explaining
that safety is not about compliance or implementing controls.”
– “As for now safety has not the degree of importance to sup-
port testing views and arguments against system designers and
management.”
. . .SPs suffer from late decision making (5): “If I am not al-
lowed to do my job early in the process (requirements stage),
safety becomes more costly and I as a safety practitioner am
viewed as a late check in the box to get through a program
rather than an integral part of a design team.”
. . .SPs’ activities have no lasting value (1): “The safety practi-
tioner is neither equipped, nor capable of making the decisions
needed for a higher level of safety. Being mostly policemen,
enforcers and rule designers, little if any of their contributions
have any meaningful or lasting value.”
Supportive Notions of Safety 20 respondents describe their
experiences with or their view of a supportive or highly-valued
safety culture. They report that . . .
. . .SPs’ findings are important and heard (6): “My job is im-
portant because safety is valued and considered necessary.” –
“Most people in my organisation understand the importance of
safety. This is positive.” – “There are not many people who
practice safety, since it is a tedious job. So we are highly val-
ued.”
. . .SPs are properly included in the process (1): “Safety is fun-
damental to the work we do and is ingrained into our processes
in such a way that its impossible to ignore. While it makes
jobs harder with much more analysis and review processes and
every stage of the product’s development, we know its vital.”
Other Notions of Safety 9 SPs describe an ambivalent pic-
ture, saying that it depends on individual projects whether their
jobs are negatively or positively affected: “Safety at the last two
places I worked is a check box activity at best. Other places
I’ve worked it was started early in the pre-design phase. Start-
ing early is more cost and schedule effective with a better end
product.”
5 SPs refer to a regulation-driven notion of safety: “Positively
affected. In aerospace, safety is part of fundamental engineer-
ing principles, so the process is embedded in systems engineer-
ing and does not get left out.”
From a budget- or schedule-driven perspective, respondents (4)
observe that “the budget for tools and training is never enough”
and that “resources, budget, support depend on the view/culture
of safety.”
Finally, 12 respondents claim, by saying “no”, that the notion
of safety does not have any effect on their jobs.
4.3.13 qUndesiredEv: Role of Undesired Events for Safety
Figure 21 shows a clearly disagreeing response on whether lack
of failures reduces the need for carrying through safety activ-
ities (a). We have a more ambiguous agreement on whether
safety implies reliability (e), that is, on whether having assured
the safety of a system usually includes having also assured the
reliability of a system. Moreover, known and reported acci-
dents seem to be important for the argumentation of the need
for safety (b,c). However, the agreement on whether a “lack of
accidents weakens arguments for the need of safety” (d) varies
more.
4.3.14 qValOfContrib: Value of SPs’ Contributions
According to Figure 22a, the majority of respondents perceives
their role in the system life cycle as highly valuable or better.
The analysis and comments in the Sections 4.3.11 and 4.3.12
provide a more differentiated picture of this answer.
4.3.15 qCoWorkers: Viewing SPs’ Co-workers
Figure 22b suggests that the respondents vary strongly in eval-
uating their contributions to the system life-cycle when trying
to imagine their non-safety co-workers appreciation.
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Figure 21: qUndesiredEv (N = 97): Role of undesired
events (i.e., failures, incidents, and accidents) for safety – Rate
your level of agreement with 5 statements about safety activi-
ties.
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(a) qValOfContrib (N = 95): Value of SPs’ contributions – Of how
much value is your role as a practitioner or researcher in safety-critical
system developments?
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(b) qCoWorkers (N = 95): Viewing SPs’ co-workers – Howmuch value
do non-safety co-workers attribute to the role of a safety practitioner?
Figure 22: Self-perception of SPs’ role
4.3.16 qImpOfExp: Influence of Experience
From the responses, Figure 23 shows that experience in safety
activities is believed to be positively associated with improved
hazard handling (a,b), particularly, experience from similar
previous projects (b). Adversarial thinking (c) receives the least
agreement.
4.4 Hypothesis Analysis and Test Results
Table 7 presents the test results for all hypotheses listed in Ta-
ble 5 and based on the summary in Section 4.3. Motivations
for the acceptance criteria given in Table 5 are provided in Sec-
tion 3.4.1. In summary, we were not able to find significant
differences for the pairs of groups (IVs) we compared with re-
spect to several DVs.
5 Discussion
We interpret the responses (Section 5.1), draw a relationship
to existing evidence (Section 5.2), and assess the validity of
our study (Section 5.4). From these discussions, we derive our
conclusions in Section 6.
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Figure 23: qImpOfExp (N = 96): Role of experience – Spec-
ify your level of agreement with 3 statements about the role of
experience and adversarial thinking in safety activities.
5.1 Interpretation of the Results and Findings
The following discussion takes into account the hypothesis
analysis and test results summarised in Table 7. Details about
the hypotheses and the questions referred to in the text are given
in the Tables 4 and 5.
5.1.1 Findings for RQ1: Means of Work in Safety Practice
Hypothesis hExpDecides is supported This should not be
surprising as it mirrors a rather typical situation in many engi-
neering disciplines and projects. However, relying too much on
knowledge of experts can form a single point of failure of an
organisation. Moreover, relying too much on experience from
similar projects can go along with wrongly transferring former
conclusions (i.e., project memory) and not updating them cor-
respondingly.
Finding 1 The responses suggest that safety strongly de-
pends on expert opinion and project memory.
Hypothesis hInsufStds is supported With regard to the
given application domains (qAdeqOfMthStd, Section 4.3.4),
the result for hInsufStds is negative: Our responses indi-
cate that inadequate methods or standards constitute a real
issue in current high-automation safety practice. However,
from qImpOfConstr in Figure 13, we know SPs think that
“vague safety standards” are problematic, though, least prob-
lematic of all inquired process constraints and issues. The 22
to 36 excluded dnk-answers might stem from the fact that most
respondents can only make a statement for a small subset of
the inquired application domains. We believe, the exclusion
of these responses does therefore not influence our conclusion.
Moreover, the observation of a lack of appropriate standards
and certification guidelines is anecdotally confirmed by Mc-
Dermid and Rae [14] and empirically in the automated vehicle
testing domain by Knauss et al. [51, pp. 1878f].
Finding 2 In the considered high automation domains,
the adequacy of standards and methods for safety assur-
ance is rated with low to very low.
Hypothesis hInsufMeth is rejected Because of overlap-
ping Means, the rejection of hInsufMeth contrasts the sup-
port of hInsufStds. We see a tendency towards our expe-
rience from collaborations with industry (Section 1.1) justi-
fying hInsufMeth. We interpret the respondents’ ambiguous
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Table 7: Results of hypotheses analysis and tests. Legend: AC. . . acceptance criterion
Analysis of Base Hypotheses From the responses to . . . . . .we conclude that . . .
hExpDecides: Dependence on expert
opinion
qValueOfKnow (Section 4.3.1) and
qImpOfExp (Section 4.3.16)
our AC is fulfilled.
hLoResLoSaf: Resources govern
performance of SPs
qImpOfConstr (Section 4.3.2) and
qImpOfEco (Section 4.3.3)
the qImpOfEco-part of our AC is not
fulfilled.
hInsufStds: Inadequate means in
high-automation
qAdeqOfMthStd (Section 4.3.4) our AC is fulfilled.
hInsufMeth: Low method adequacy qAppOfMeth (Section 4.3.5) and
qPosImpOfFMs (Section 4.3.6)
the qAppOfMeth-part of our AC is not
fulfilled by the nand-median.
hFMsImprSaf: Positive impact of formal
methods
qPosImpOfFMs (Section 4.3.6) our AC is fulfilled.
hSPsAdptSkls: Necessity of skill adaptation qImprOfSkills (Section 4.3.7) our AC is fulfilled.
hSafBySec: Dependence on IT security qIntOfSafSec (Section 4.3.8) our AC is fulfilled.
hSafIsCost: Safety is a cost-benefit question qNotionOfSafety (Section 4.3.9) the qNotionOfSafety-a-part of our AC is
not fulfilled.
hLoCollLoSaf: Benefit of safety-security
interaction
qIntOfSafSec (Section 4.3.8) our AC is fulfilled.
hHiPrioHiSaf: Benefit of
safety-as-a-priority
qPrioOfSafety (Section 4.3.10) our AC is fulfilled.
hSafIsRel: Safety is a special case of
reliability
qUndesiredEv (Section 4.3.13) none of the qUndesiredEv-parts of our AC
are fulfilled.
hSafIsValued: High contribution to life
cycle
qCoWorkers (Section 4.3.15) and
qValOfContrib (Section 4.3.14)
the qCoWorkers-part of our AC is not
fulfilled.
hPosSelfImg: High contribution
(self-image)
qValOfContrib (Section 4.3.14) and
qCoWorkers (Section 4.3.15)
our AC is fulfilled.
Test of Comparative Hypotheses From the comparison of . . . . . .we conclude that . . .
hExp:DivGTSing: Benefit of diverse
expertise
senior SPs with junior SPs (from responses
to qImpOfExp, Section 4.3.16)
our AC is fulfilled.
hValue:SenLTJun: Assoc. of expertise &
value
senior SPs with junior SPs with p = 0.15, our AC is not fulfilled.
hAdapt:SenGTJun: Assoc. of expertise &
skill adaptation
senior SPs with junior SPs with p = 0.052, our AC is almost fulfilled.
hAdapt:AutoGTAero: Assoc. of standards
& skill adaptation
SPs using automotive standards with SPs
using aerospace standards
with p = 0.048, our AC is fulfilled.
hInsufMeth:EngDifSci: Assoc. of
profession & inadequate means
engineering-focused SPs with
research-focused SPs
with p = 0.22, our AC is not fulfilled.
hInsufMeth:AutoGTAero: Assoc. of
standards & inadequate means
SPs using automotive standards with SPs
using aerospace standards
with p = 0.54, our AC is not fulfilled.
agreement with “available standards and methods have become
too difficult” as “they can be challenging to apply.” However,
from our data, we are unable to explain possible reasons for the
adequacy or inadequacy of means.
Hypothesis hFMsImprSaf is supported The low number of
valid responses to question qPosImpOfFMs limits the support
of hFMsImprSaf. Both, the question qPosImpOfFMs and the
notion of a formal method are abstract. Moreover, the classifi-
cation questions do not provide enough information about our
respondents’ experience with FMs.
Finding 3 Among the informed respondents, formal
methods are believed to be beneficial.
The breadth of our exploration made it necessary to sacrifice the
level of detail for certain questions, for example, qAppOfMeth,
to keep the questionnaire short. Adequacy could be measured
by a set of questions to facilitate a more fine-grained analysis.
For example, asking for agreement in question qAppOfMeth
can be substituted by asking for the level of Adequacy. Addi-
tionally, question qAppOfMeth could be asked for each tech-
nique and standard and analysed for sensitivity to industry-
specific sub-groups of respondents. For example, the survey
in [66] refines some of these ideas.
5.1.2 Findings for RQ2: Impact of Process Factors
Hypothesis hLoResLoSaf is rejected Four respondents to
question qEffNotionOnJob report to have experienced a lack of
resources for safety activities. This is consistent with the data
checked for the AC of hLoResLoSaf. Although the responses
suggest that the implication lack of resources has negative im-
pact on safety might hold, the antecedent of this hypothesis is
not broadly supported.
Finding 4 The respondents suggest that resources occa-
sionally but not typically govern SPs’ performance.
However, by weakening hLoResLoSaf, we can acknowledge
the “often” third of SPs showing a situation demanding for re-
action in the community.
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Hypothesis hSafIsCost is rejected We identify a weak pos-
itive association: Safety is most frequently viewed as a cost-
independent necessity (qNotionOfSafety-c, hSafIsCost) and the
median of qImpOfEco (hLoResLoSaf) lies at economic factors
rarely or occasionally influence safety. So, for hSafIsCost, the
many positive responses to the options (c,d,e) underpin the view
of safety as a cost-independent factor in management decision
making. We consider this to be positive but stress the need of a
specific study of this finding.
Finding 5 Our respondents suggest that safety is not typ-
ically a question of cost-benefit.
Hypotheses hLoCollLoSaf is supported Our data supports
hSafBySec, stating that safety assurance strongly depends on
security assurance. Interestingly, for hLoCollLoSaf, SPs agree
on both that . . .
Finding 6 . . . a lack of collaboration downgrades the per-
formance of safety activities (qIntOfSafSec-h,i), and
Finding 7 . . . interaction between safety and security
practitioners rarely occurs in requirements and assurance
activities (qIntOfSafSec-f,g).
Apart from desirable interactions at an organisational level, po-
tential dependence of security on safety (qIntOfSafSec-b,d) is
less obvious to our respondents than potential dependence of
safety on security (qIntOfSafSec-a,c,e). While the latter is com-
paratively well known, the former is more difficult to grasp.
Further investigations of this interaction based on practitioners’
experience, such as [33], are necessary.
Finding 8 Early collaboration of safety and security ex-
perts is viewed as essential.
Hypothesis hExp:DivGTSing is supported Although the
three propositions in Figure 23 seem obvious, we included them
in the questionnaire to confirm that such assumptions are made
by SPs (hExp:DivGTSing). The support of hExp:DivGTSing
backs the support of hExpDecides.
Finding 9 Our respondents see diverse expertise as es-
sential for safety practitioners.
Hypothesis hAdapt:SenGTJun versus
hAdapt:AutoGTAero and hSPsAdptSkls The result
for hAdapt:SenGTJun and hSPsAdptSkls is unsurprising
because senior experts are expected to have seen paradigm
shifts and technology changes more often than junior SPs.
However, the small difference between both groups indicates
that senior experts would avoid outdated skills as much as ju-
nior professionals would. The support of hAdapt:AutoGTAero
suggests that automotive SPs see a stronger necessity of skill
adaptation than aeronautic SPs. One reason for this devel-
opment could be the currently raising demand for functional
safety of increasingly complex driver assistance systems.
Finding 10 Respondents from the automotive domain
perceive adaptation of skills to new technologies to be
more relevant for SPs than respondents from the aeronau-
tics domain.
5.1.3 Findings for RQ3: Perception of Safety Practice
Hypothesis hSafIsRel is rejected We perceive the results
for hSafIsRel as positive because the issue of “confusing safety
with reliability” raised in [22, p. 7, Assumption 1] can not be
confirmed from the analysis of our responses. In fact, we ob-
serve an opposite tendency from our sample and assume this to
be the effect of those SPs having been trained on that issue.
Finding 11 The assurance of the reliability of a system
does not imply the assurance of its safety.
From the responses to qUndesiredEv-a, we derive that assured
reliability of a system does not reduce the need for safety activ-
ities. Consequently, these responses do not justify the hypothe-
sis high reliability implies high safety. However, we might ex-
pect to see agreement on the hypothesis high safety implies high
reliability (qUndesiredEv-e). Likewise, our responses are am-
biguous in that case. The most reasonable explanation for this
ambiguity is that we did not explain the meaning of such impli-
cations along with the given answer options. Overall, the data
gathered from qUndesiredEv-a–e indicates that respondents un-
derstand safety to be different from reliability. Moreover, these
answers suggest that safety and safety activities are more driven
by system accidents than by system failures. And this again
complies with Leveson’s [22] findings about the difference of
safety and reliability.
Questions qEffRoleOnJob and qEffNotionOnJob 56 re-
spondents state that their role is clearly defined. 37 perceive
positive impacts on their activities, particularly, fostering clear
responsibilities, authority, and escalation routes.
30 respondents state that their role is not clearly defined. 15
of them perceive negative impacts in form of unclear respon-
sibilities, limited authority, autonomy, and space for discre-
tionary activity as well as unclear or late decision making (Sec-
tion 4.3.11).
Finding 12 Many respondents state that their role is of-
ten not clearly defined and that they experience negative
impacts from this.
24 participants experience a non-supportive, misunderstood, or
underrated safety culture. As opposed to that, 20 respondents
perceive a supportive or highly-valued safety culture. 9 persons
provided an ambivalent picture of safety culture, stating that
they have gathered contrasting experiences (Section 4.3.12).
Finding 13 The respondents perceive to a similar extent
both, supportive and non-supportive safety cultures.
Hypothesis hPosSelfImg is supported While responses
to qValOfContrib support hPosSelfImg, the frequent indication
of “medium value”, particularly for qCoWorkers, suggests that
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some SPs might either not be convinced of the role, their profes-
sion, or even unsatisfied with their tasks and their job profile.
Section 4.3.11 provides some explanation for such a dissatis-
faction coming from an unclear role definition. Section 4.3.12
delivers an explanation from a non-supportive safety culture.
Again, this indication provides further motivation for an ex-
tended study.
The perception of an SP’s role and contribution by non-safety
co-workers slightly differs from how SPs perceive their own
role. This might not be too surprising because qValOfContrib
and qCoWorkers redundantly measure fragments of a partici-
pant’s self-perception.
Finding 14 The respondents are self-confident about
their contribution as a safety practitioner.
5.2 Relation to Existing Evidence
In Table 8, we summarise our findings and, below, we compare
them with findings from related studies.
Graaf et al. [24] identify legacy incompatibility, lack of matu-
rity, and additional complexity of new methods, languages, and
tools as three obstacles to the early adoption of such means.
Similar obstacles were observed in software testing by Kasuri-
nen et al. [25]. These observations are consistent with F1 that
knowledge from previous projects has the strongest influence.
The participants’ belief that FMs can have a positive impact
on safety activities F3 is strengthened by the survey of em-
bedded SE researchers and practitioners in [67, pp. 102f]. The
authors observe that about 30% of responses from industry de-
clare the need for FMs as a reason to adopt model-based engi-
neering (MBE) and that MBE adoption has a positive effect on
FM adoption.
Martins and Gorschek [16] observe a lack of evidence for the
usefulness and usability of new approaches from safety re-
search. Their observation is not in conflict with finding F3,
because SPs can perceive usefulness of new FMs independent
of evidence. The authors perceive a dominance of conventional
approaches in practice which is consistent with finding F1. Fur-
thermore, they observe a lack of investigations about the im-
provement of communication in the life cycle. Huber et al. [33]
address this demand and confirm the findings F7 and F8. F8
indicates that such studies would be of interest to practitioners.
Chen et al. [27] observe that assurance cases can improve cross-
disciplinary collaboration but are missing tool support and ex-
perienced personnel. A lack of research transfer and training
could explain the contrast to finding F10, given that assurance
cases are seen as a new method by SPs.
By observing insufficient tool support for change impact analy-
sis in safety practice, Borg et al. [31] and De la Vara et al. [32]
contrast the rejection of hInsufMeth.
McDermid and Rae [14] could find no satisfactory explana-
tion to their observation that systems got “so safe despite in-
adequate and inadequately applied techniques.” However, their
assumption is orthogonal to finding F2, contrasts the rejection
of hInsufMeth, and motivates further research. The lack of con-
sensus on how to combine case-based [26] and compliance-
based [28] assurance underpins this lack of clarity about the
adequacy of means.
Finding F1 supports the observation of Nair et al. [30] that ex-
pert judgements and checklists are among the most frequently
used references to assess safety arguments and evidence (see
Figure 12). F1 is also shared by Rae and Alexander [44] who
conclude that critical aspects of safety analysis (e.g. identifying
hazards, estimating risk probability and consequence severity)
often rely on expert opinion. Moreover, F1 underpins two out
of Wang’s andWagner’s [29] top ten identified decision making
pitfalls.
Leveson [22] observes that safety is pervasively confused (or
assumed to correlate) with reliability. The data for finding F11
supports her conclusion. However, the consensus of our re-
sponses suggests that there is broad awareness that safety and
reliability are two related but distinct properties of a system.
Overall, we found supportive and contrasting evidence regard-
ing most findings for RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3.
5.3 General Feedback on the Survey
The last page of our questionnaire contains a text field for gen-
eral feedback. One issue, the participants criticised, pertains to
the scope and the terminology used in the questionnaire:
The respondents noted that the inquiry is general and does
not account for the diversity of safety practices in various in-
dustries. Some questions rely on a particular interpretation
of safety practice leaving assumptions implicit and risking to
get in conflict with other views of system safety, for example,
“safety by introduction of controls” versus “safety assurance
and assessment.” Moreover, some of the questions are hard to
answer because of a lack of standardised terminology across
domains and because of missing topics, for example, legal
safety requirements and regulations, human operators, socio-
technical systems were not mentioned.
We see such feedback as a confirmation for the need of cross-
disciplinary explorations like ours. Such explorations can help
to find a terminology suitable for most SPs. When designing
our questionnaire, we were driven by the variety of experiences
from several collaborations with industry. Moreover, we had to
prioritise and cut the question catalogue to stay within a maxi-
mum duration of 30 minutes, an amount of time we believe to
be affordable by most participants. After several iterations and
an email-based focus group, we finalised the questionnaire to
be released.
Except for qAdeqOfMthStd and qPosImpOfFMs, the accept-
ably low number (< 10%) of dnk-responses indicates that most
respondents did not seem to struggle with answering. However,
frequent nand-responses indicate difficulties in deciding on the
given answer options (see, e.g. qAppOfMeth).
Another issue raised by our respondents deals with the survey
method and design we applied:
Some questions may motivate one to answer in a particular way
and solicit specific support. Likert scales impose an abstraction
with the risk to deny more accurate answers such as “I often
highly agree and sometimes I strongly disagree.” Moreover,
Likert scales should be substituted by open questions more
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Table 8: Overview of findings from hypothesis analysis
RQ1: Which means do SPs
typically rely on? How helpful
are those means to them?
RQ2: Which typical process factors have influence on SPs’
decisions & performance?
RQ3: How do SPs perceive and
understand their role in the
process or life cycle?
F1: The responses suggest that
safety strongly depends on
expert opinion and project
memory.
F2: In the considered high
automation domains, the
adequacy of standards and
methods for safety assurance is
rated with low to very low.
F3: Among the informed
respondents, formal methods are
believed to be beneficial.
F4: The respondents suggest that resources occasionally but not
typically govern SPs’ performance.
F5: Our respondents suggest that safety is not typically a question
of cost-benefit.
F6: A lack of collaboration downgrades the performance of safety
activities.
F7: Interaction between safety and security practitioners rarely
occurs in requirements and assurance activities.
F8: Early collaboration of safety and security experts is viewed as
essential.
F9: Our respondents see diverse expertise as essential for safety
practitioners.
F10: Respondents from the automotive domain perceive
adaptation of skills to new technologies to be more relevant for
SPs than respondents from the aeronautics domain.
F11: The assurance of the
reliability of a system does not
imply the assurance of its safety.
F12: Many respondents state
that their role is often not clearly
defined and that they experience
negative impacts from this.
F13: The respondents perceive
to a similar extent both,
supportive and non-supportive
safety cultures.
F14: The respondents are
self-confident about their
contribution as a safety
practitioner.
appropriate for exploratory studies where the construct is not
known or (entirely) fixed beforehand.
To compensate for this issue, we allowed open answers and
present results from their qualitative analysis (e.g. in the Sec-
tions 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.9, 4.3.11 and 4.3.12). More open ques-
tions reduce the risks of bias and constrained data acquisition.
However, it is worth noting that, as opposed to interviews, too
many open answers in large-scale questionnaires can also be
demanding for the respondents and, thus, lead to a high number
of partial data points.
5.4 Validity Procedure after Survey Execution
Here, we assess our survey design with respect to internal and
external validity as well as reliability [62, 68].
5.4.1 Internal Validity
To reduce threats to internal validity, we followed recommen-
dations on questionnaire-based surveys in the software and sys-
tems engineering domain [69]. Section 5.3 discusses arguments
for internal validity as a response to the general feedback on our
survey. Additionally, the everyday use of English among the
majority of survey participants (see the criterion Native Lan-
guages) supports the accuracy of a large fraction of the data
points.
5.4.2 External Validity
To which extent would the procedure in Section 3 lead to simi-
lar results with different samples?
Our sampling procedure is network-guided and, hence, not uni-
formly random [60]. Section 4.2 shows that our sample varies
over the scales of all classification criteria (Table 1). The over-
lap of the summer holiday season with the sampling period
might have slightly influenced the total number of data points.
Regarding safety cultures, our sample well represents the back-
grounds (mainly engineering), domains (mainly aerospace, au-
tomotive, railway), and geographical regions (mainly Europe
and US) identified in Section 4.2. Moreover, the rejection
of hInsufMeth:EngDifSci (i.e., practitioners differ from aca-
demics in their view of inadequacy of means) strongly reduces
the likelihood that the participation of researchers biases the re-
sults towards an academic view.
According to Figure 11, 19 out of 124 respondents stated that
they have been working on safety-related topics as a researcher
in academia, that is, the role or responsibility profile which
we associate the least of all with genuine practical experience.
Only 4 of them declared to be solely academic researchers. 8
stated to be SPs, too; 7 have also done research in industry; 11
have worked as software, systems, requirements, reliability, or
health & safety practitioners in addition. This again strengthens
our belief that our results are not biased towards an academic
view.
In comparison with focus groups and individual interviews,
anonymous on-line surveys are highly valuable inasmuch as
they help mitigating the two following risks:
1. In collaborations between academia and industry, in-
dustrial participants are likely from the management,
or senior engineers, or research engineers not neces-
sarily regularly connected to the operational teams.
Such collaborations bear the risk of the sample get-
ting biased towards these roles. With an on-line sur-
vey advertised on multiple channels, we are convinced
to have reduced such bias.
2. Safety activities are legally critical. The authors’ ex-
perience from personal interviews is that practitioners
tend to avoid talking loosely about their organisations
and, where aggravating, to moderately generalise. Our
impression from the respondents’ occasionally quite
open comments makes us to believe that the risk of
this bias is lower in anonymous surveys. Note that
subjectivity has to be handled by other means in both
questionnaires and interviews.
Leveson [22, p. 211] states that FMEA, with its limited appli-
cability for safety analysis, is less frequently used as a hazard
analysis technique than FTA or ETA. As opposed to Leveson’s
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observation, our respondents most often state that they worked
with FMEA-based techniques (cf. Figure 8). One reason for
this discrepancy could be that we provided a small set of tech-
niques as answer options to Familiarity with Methods (e.g. ETA
was not included). Assuming that respondents are reluctant
to use the “Other” field, this might have led to a bias towards
the specified options. Assuming that Leveson’s observation is
mainly derived from US safety cultures, this discrepancy could
also result from the focus of our sample on European safety
cultures (cf. Geographical Regions in Section 4.2). While this
issue limits the external validity, we believe that the results for
the questions and the hypotheses are not harmed.
The isolation of most questions allows a per-question analy-
sis. Particularly, the 59 partial responses do not affect any
complete data points and thus were taken into consideration
for the questions for which they delivered responses (cf. vari-
ation of N values). The relatively high number of registered
views (565) might stem from users checking the questionnaire
start page and concluding that they do not belong to the target
group (Section 3.5): Diverse preconceptions of safety, diverse
channel members, and necessarily short advertisements might
have played a role. While this issue reduces the total number of
relevant respondents, we believe to have well prevented illegi-
ble respondents from participating.
We expect the population of SPs to be 2 to 3 orders of magni-
tude larger than our sample (N = 91,N′ = 124). According to
an estimation in [70], general conclusions require about twice
as many data points. For example, Manotas et al. [64] sample
the population with the support of global software companies.
Such approaches might lead to a larger number of responses
than with using volunteer and cluster-based sampling from on-
line discussion channels. However, we believe our approach
better reduces biases to a specific domain, company, or region.
5.4.3 Reliability
To which extent would a repetition of the procedure in Section 3
with the same sample lead to the same results?
It is difficult to exactly repeat this survey in the short term be-
cause our advertisements covered many of the relevant on-line
channels and we expect many of the respondents not willing to
participate again within short-term. This is a general problem
for studies of this kind. Therefore, we suggest to 1. provide in-
centives, 2. pursue off-line channels as well, 3. repeat the study
in the long term, and 4. extend the sampling period. For ex-
ample, Mendez-Fernandez et al. [71] provide a longitudinal
design supporting repeatability and hence the determination of
reliability of the results.
5.5 Lessons Learned
Regarding the sample size (Section 4.2), we wished to get
more responses against the background of the effort we spent
in reaching out to the population (Section 4.1). From the Uni-
park questionnaire view statistics, we saw that in some of the
larger discussion forums, users seemed to appear noticeably re-
luctant to respond. The return rates estimated in Section 4.1 are
low. In some channels, our friendly, singular, and topic-related
post was even penalised by deleting the post or by loosing chan-
nel membership. Unfortunately, non-commercial panels, such
as SoSciSurvey12 and SurveyCircle (Table 6), do not offer pro-
filing facilities to focus on engineering professionals. In the
case of no budget for incentives and for paying commercial
panels, these circumstances make it very difficult for empirical
researchers to get a representative sample.
6 Conclusions and FutureWork
We conducted a questionnaire-based cross-sectional on-line
survey of safety practitioners. Our objective was to explore
safety practice by asking practitioners about means they rely
on, process factors influencing their work, and their role in the
life cycle, and by checking several observations from previous
collaborations.
6.1 Summary of Findings and Implications
Below, observations marked with + represent our aspirations
when performing the study. Observations marked with − rep-
resent our apprehensions. Other items accommodate neutral
observations.
We collected evidence in support of several hypotheses leading
to the following observations:
• Our respondents confirm that safety decision making
is largely based on expert opinion and experience from
previous projects.
• For connected systems (e.g. systems of systems, con-
nected transport systems), our respondents believe that
assurance of safety also relies on the assurance of IT
security.
+ They see a clear benefit in the interaction of safety
and security activities. We support the agenda in
[16] and encourage further research on integrated
safety/security approaches.
+ The survey participants believe that formal methods
have a positive impact on safety activities.
– Many of them see currently applied standards and
methods as inadequate for the assurance of technolo-
gies (e.g. adaptive control, machine learning) in high
automation and autonomy. This justifies the question
of whether future systems will be safe enough and why
this would be the case [14]?
Our respondents allow further observations:
• They suggest that resources occasionally govern
safety practitioners’ decisions and performance but
also that safety is not typically handled as a
cost/benefit question.
• The survey participants refrain from seeing safety as
a consequence of reliability. This stands in contrast
with Leveson’s former observation that safety is per-
vasively confused with reliability [22].
– The respondents believe that many of their non-safety
co-workers’ share at most medium appreciation of
safety practitioners’ contributions to the life cycle.
12See https://www.soscisurvey.de.
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• The respondents are indecisive on whether the con-
ventional or ready-to-use methods they (could) apply
scale sufficiently.
The last finding motivates analysis along the lines of McDer-
mid and Rae [14]. If we are unsure about whether means have
become inadequate and, as found for safety RE in [16], if con-
ventional approaches are dominant and we lack evidence for ef-
ficacy of novel research, what good is safety research for safety
practitioners?
In summary, we share with Alexander and Rae [49] the impres-
sion that empirical research in system safety is still in an early
stage, on the one hand, offering many opportunities to perform
cross-disciplinary studies and, on the other hand, bearing large
risks of not exactly knowing to which extent safety practition-
ers are applying state of the art and able to do their best. We
believe that this is a serious issue to be tackled by software and
system safety research.
6.2 Future Work
We seek to extend our analysis by revisiting findings from the
collected data set and not discussed in this work. Furthermore,
we are going to identify and evaluate further hypotheses and
ask more why- and how-questions.
Aspiring to the exploratory approach and grounded theory [62,
p. 298], we can further engage with our survey participants us-
ing the focus group method [72], request for comments on our
findings, and ask them for approaches to overcome the identi-
fied issues. Additionally, we refine our construct and elaborate
on a subset of questions to investigate the applicability of for-
mal methods like, for example, shown in [66].
Our research design can be extended towards the application
of the goal question metric approach [73]: The results of the
hypotheses analysis promotes the definition of goals of safety
activities, the survey questions corresponding to the hypotheses
can be refined, and process and productmetrics be derived from
the refined questions, for example, as already suggested and
discussed in [74, 75]. Our study object includes safety practi-
tioners and, consequently, some of these metrics get measurable
by questionnaires.
Our results are a good starting point for the design of a lon-
gitudinal study, offering possibilities to identify and validate
causal relationships among the measured variables (Table 2).
Inspired by [30] and [76], we want to adapt our research de-
sign to support investigations of confirmation bias in assurance
arguments [49, 77].
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A Summary of All Responses
The following tables present data summaries for all closed
(q)uestions according to Table 4 and questions for classifica-
tion according to Table 1. The “Option” column refers to
the parts (if any) of multi-part questions. The “NA’s” col-
umn signifies the number of invalid data points for each (part
of a) question. The checksum (including invalid responses)
of each row results in N = 152 responses. Rows with NA’s
= 0 result from parts (i.e., answer categories) added after
content analysis of half-open questions (Section 3.6.1). The
questions qEffRoleOnJob and qEffNotionOnJob are open and,
hence, not accompanied by a corresponding table.
qValueOfKnow Value
Option
/ N
Very
low
Low Medium High Very
high
NA’s
a / 96 1 4 14 40 37 56
b / 96 1 3 25 36 31 56
c / 95 2 10 33 37 13 57
d / 95 1 1 13 53 27 57
e / 96 9 34 37 10 6 56
f / 96 1 8 47 32 8 56
g / 97 1 0 7 39 50 55
Legend: a. Hazard list from previous projects, b. Case (accident, inci-
dent) reports, c. Inspection checklist, d. Expert opinions, e. Manage-
ment recommendations, f. Co-workers’ recommendations, g. Safety-
related project experience
qImpOfConstr Impact
Option
/ N
Do
not
know
No
im-
pact
Low
im-
pact
Medium
im-
pact
High
im-
pact
NA’s
a / 98 5 5 12 39 37 54
b / 96 2 4 6 31 53 56
c / 95 6 2 5 36 46 57
d / 95 5 4 12 31 43 57
e / 97 4 3 9 25 56 55
f / 97 1 4 23 35 34 55
g / 98 2 2 11 27 56 54
Legend: a. Budget cuts, b. Late or unclear choice of safety concepts,
c. Postponed safety decisions, d. Schedule pressure, e. Erroneous haz-
ard analyses, f. Vague safety standards, g. Inexperienced safety engi-
neers
qImpOfEco Frequency
Option /
N
Often Rarely
/ Occa-
sionally
Never Do not
know
NA’s
– / 99 36 48 9 6 53
qAdeqOfMthStd Adequacy
Option
/ N
Do
not
know
Not
ade-
quate
Slightly
ade-
quate
AdequateVery
ade-
quate
NA’s
a / 100 32 31 26 11 0 52
b / 101 22 30 33 13 3 51
c / 101 26 31 27 16 1 51
d / 101 22 48 23 8 0 51
e / 100 36 7 25 27 5 52
f / 101 29 10 26 30 6 51
g / 99 32 28 21 17 1 53
Legend: a. Self-adaptive systems, b. Highly automated and au-
tonomous driving, c. Distributed networked systems, d. AI/ML-based
applications, e. Medical and healthcare applications, f. Highly auto-
mated air traffic control, g. Consumer or commercial drones
qAppOfMeth Agreement
Option
/ N
Do
not
know
Strongly
dis-
agree
DisagreeNeither
agree
nor
dis-
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
NA’s
–
/ 102
5 3 28 18 37 11 50
qPosImpOfFMs Impact
Option
/ N
Do
not
know
No
im-
pact
Low
im-
pact
Medium
im-
pact
High
im-
pact
NA’s
– / 62 4 3 15 23 17 90
qImprOfSkills Agreement
Option
/ N
Do
not
know
Strongly
dis-
agree
DisagreeNeither
agree
nor
dis-
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
NA’s
a / 96 1 1 3 5 37 49 56
b / 95 9 1 14 17 36 18 57
c / 96 6 1 4 13 53 19 56
d / 95 12 6 18 21 32 6 57
Legend: a. Adapt skills to new technologies, b. Study state-of-the-art
safety principles, c. Juniors learn from seniors, d. Juniors learn from
accident reports
qIntOfSafSec Agreement
Option
/ N
Do
not
know
Strongly
dis-
agree
DisagreeNeither
agree
nor
dis-
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
NA’s
a / 94 3 5 13 14 35 24 58
b / 95 3 10 30 23 19 10 57
c / 93 4 4 11 15 36 23 59
d / 93 6 8 22 28 20 9 59
e / 93 5 3 10 9 42 24 59
f / 94 11 1 9 13 43 17 58
g / 92 11 0 12 16 41 12 60
h / 94 4 1 4 12 38 35 58
i / 94 5 4 3 12 49 21 58
j / 94 3 0 3 5 41 42 58
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Legend: a. Security is prerequisite for safety, b. Safety is prerequi-
site for security, c. SPs depend on security practitioners, d. Security
practitioners depend on SPs, e. Safety assurance requires security as-
surcance, f. Rare interaction in requirements stage, g. Rare interaction
in assurance stage, h. Lack of collaboration is hazardous, i. Lack of
collaboration is inefficient, j. Involvement in RE improves safety
qNotionOfSafety Multiple Choice
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
a / 95 30 65 57
b / 95 27 68 57
c / 95 50 45 57
d / 95 30 65 57
e / 95 21 74 57
Legend: a. A cost factor, b. A beneficial factor, c. A necessity indepen-
dent of cost, d. A tedious mandated task, e. A secondary issue
qPrioOfSafety Agreement
Option
/ N
Do
not
know
Strongly
dis-
agree
DisagreeNeither
agree
nor
dis-
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
NA’s
a / 97 1 1 1 7 44 43 55
b / 97 3 2 3 8 40 41 55
c / 97 2 2 2 16 44 31 55
d / 97 2 2 1 7 41 44 55
Legend: a. Safety is given high priority, b. Management highly values
safety, c. SPs have declared authority, d. Safety process is defined
qUndesiredEv Agreement
Option
/ N
Do
not
know
Strongly
dis-
agree
DisagreeNeither
agree
nor
dis-
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
NA’s
a / 97 2 57 28 3 5 2 55
b / 96 1 11 18 12 37 17 56
c / 96 1 4 6 15 44 26 56
d / 97 2 17 18 21 29 10 55
e / 96 3 25 25 15 19 9 56
Legend: a. Lack of failures reduces need for safety, b. Accidents drive
need for safety, c. Accidents help SPs argue for safety, d. Lack of ac-
cidents reduces need for safety, e. Safety implies reliability
qValOfContrib Value
Option
/ N
Very
low
Low Medium High Very
high
NA’s
– / 95 2 6 25 48 14 57
qCoWorkers Value
Option
/ N
Very
low
Low Medium High Very
high
NA’s
– / 95 4 19 37 28 7 57
qImpOfExp Agreement
Option
/ N
Do
not
know
Strongly
dis-
agree
DisagreeNeither
agree
nor
dis-
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
NA’s
a / 95 3 2 6 11 41 32 57
b / 95 3 1 4 13 47 27 57
c / 96 16 2 2 27 29 20 56
Legend: a. Senior SPs outperform junior SPs, b. Previous projects ex-
perience is beneficial, c. Adversarial thinking improves hazard analy-
sis
Educational Background Multiple Choice (Classification)
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
a / 124 49 75 28
b / 124 13 111 28
e / 124 23 101 28
f / 124 31 93 28
g / 124 22 102 28
h / 124 12 112 28
k / 124 6 118 28
Legend: a. Computer Science, b. Systems Engineering, e. Safety Sci-
ence, f. Electrical and Electronics Engineering, g. Mechanical and
Aerospace Engineering, h. Physics and Mathematics, k. Other Dis-
cipline
Application Domains Multiple Choice (Classification)
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
a / 124 51 73 28
b / 124 54 70 28
c / 124 16 108 28
d / 124 19 105 28
e / 124 30 94 28
f / 124 17 107 28
g / 124 24 100 28
h / 124 9 115 28
j / 124 25 99 28
l / 124 15 109 28
m / 124 8 116 28
o / 152 15 137 0
p / 152 6 146 0
Legend: a. Automotive and Transport Systems, b. Aerospace Industry,
c. IT Infrastructure and Networking, d. Power and Nuclear Industry,
e. Industrial Processes and Plant Automation, f. Electronic Devices
and Appliances, g. Healthcare Systems, h. Construction and Build-
ing Automation, j. Industrial Machinery, l. Naval Systems, m. Other
Domain, o. Railway and Cablecar Systems, p. Military and Defense
Systems
Level of Experience Single Choice (Years Of Experience In Levels)
Option
/ N
< 3 3 - 7 8 - 15 16 -
25
> 25 NA’s
–
/ 119
27 27 27 18 20 33
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Familiarity with Standards Multiple Choice (Classification)
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
a / 124 70 54 28
b / 124 19 105 28
c / 124 47 77 28
e / 124 3 121 28
f / 124 47 77 28
h / 124 14 110 28
i / 124 8 116 28
k / 152 3 149 0
l / 152 3 149 0
m / 152 12 140 0
n / 152 4 148 0
o / 152 14 138 0
Legend: a. Generic, b. Machinery, c. Automotive and Transport,
e. Agriculture, f. Aerospace and Avionics, h. Not Familiar, i. Other
Standard, k. Nuclear and Other Energy, l. Medical Devices, m. Rail-
way, n. Methodology and Tooling, o. Military and Defense
Familiarity with Methods Multiple Choice (Classification)
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
a / 124 90 34 28
b / 124 78 46 28
c / 124 16 108 28
d / 124 59 65 28
e / 123 4 119 29
f / 124 15 109 28
g / 124 15 109 28
i / 152 9 143 0
j / 152 3 149 0
k / 152 5 147 0
l / 152 3 149 0
m / 152 5 147 0
n / 152 4 148 0
o / 152 6 146 0
p / 152 3 149 0
Legend: a. Failure Mode Effects, b. Fault Trees, c. STAMP-based
Methods, d. Hazard Operability, e. Security Threats, f. Not Familiar,
g. Other Concept/Method, i. Functional and Design Risk, j. Proba-
bilistic Risk, k. Assurance Cases, l. Root Causes, m. Event Trees,
n. Automated VandV, o. Dependencies and Interactions, p. Bidirec-
tional Methods
Native Languages Multiple Choice (Classification)
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
a / 124 54 70 28
b / 124 38 86 28
c / 124 5 119 28
d / 124 6 118 28
e / 124 2 122 28
g / 152 3 149 0
h / 152 3 149 0
i / 152 14 138 0
Legend: a. English, b. German, c. Italian, d. French, e. Chinese, g. Por-
tuguese, h. Swedish, i. Other language
Working Languages Multiple Choice (Classification)
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
a / 124 113 11 28
b / 124 41 83 28
c / 124 5 119 28
d / 124 10 114 28
e / 124 12 112 28
Legend: a. English, b. German, c. Italian, d. French, e. Other language
Safety-related Roles Multiple Choice (Classification)
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
a / 124 62 62 28
e / 124 29 95 28
f / 124 9 115 28
g / 124 39 85 28
h / 124 23 101 28
j / 124 11 113 28
k / 124 3 121 28
m / 66 12 54 86
n / 124 4 120 28
q / 152 3 149 0
Legend: a. Safety Practitioner, e. Software Practitioner, f. Electrical
or Electronics Practitioner, g. Systems Practitioner, h. Requirements
Practitioner, j. Health and Safety Practitioner, k. IT Security Practi-
tioner, m. Reliability Practitioner, n. Other Role, q. V and V Practi-
tioner
Safety-related Roles Multiple Choice (Classification)
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
b / 124 26 98 28
c / 124 19 105 28
d / 124 5 119 28
l / 76 13 63 76
p / 152 12 140 0
Legend: b. Researcher in Industry, c. Researcher in Academia, d. As-
sistant, Trainee, or Junior, l. Practitioner with PhD degree, p. Consul-
tant / Assessor
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Table 9: List of abbreviations used in this article
AC Acceptance Criterion
CAST Causal Analysis using System Theory
CCA Common Cause Analysis
CIA Change Impact Analysis
CMA Common Mode Analysis
DV Dependent Variable
ETA Event Tree Analysis
FFA Functional Failure Analysis
FHA Functional Hazard Analysis
FM Formal Method
FMEA Failure Mode Effects Analysis
FMECA Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
FMEDA Failure Mode, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis
FRAM Functional Resonance Analysis Method
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
GSN Goal Structuring Notation
HazOp Hazard Operability (studies)
HRA Health Risk Assessment
IV Independent Variable
MC Multiple Choice
NA Not Available
OSHA Operation & Support Hazard Analysis
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis
PHL Preliminary Hazard List
RCA Root Cause Analysis
RE Requirements Engineering
RQ Research Question
SACM Structured Assurance Case Meta-Model
SCRA Supply Chain Risk Assessment
SE Software Engineering
SHA System Hazard Analysis
SHARD Software Hazard Analysis and Resolution in Design
SP Safety Practitioner
SPP Safety Practice and its Practitioners
STAMP System-Theoretic Accident Model & Processes
STPA System-Theoretic Process Analysis
STRIDE Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information dis-
closure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege
SSHA System Safety (or Sub-System) Hazard Analysis
WBA Why-Because Analysis
ZHA Zonal Hazard Analysis
ZSA Zonal Safety Analysis
B List of Abbreviations
See Table 9.
